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In this EUDO CITIZENSHIP Forum Debate, several authors consider the interrelations between 
eligibility criteria for participation in independence referendum (that may result in the creation of a 
new independent state) and the determination of putative citizenship ab initio (on day one) of such a 
state. The kick-off contribution argues for resemblance of an independence referendum franchise and 
of the initial determination of the citizenry, critically appraising the incongruence between the 
franchise for the 18 September 2014 Scottish independence referendum, and the blueprint for Scottish 
citizenship ab initio put forward by the Scottish Government in its 'Scotland's Future' White Paper. 
Contributors to this debate come from divergent disciplines (law, political science, sociology, 
philosophy). They reflect on and contest the above claims, both generally and in relation to regional 
settings including (in addition to Scotland) Catalonia/Spain, Flanders/Belgium, Quebec/Canada, Post-
Yugoslavia and Puerto-Rico/USA. 
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Imagine that you are a Scottish-born recent graduate, fortunate enough (certainly in today’s economy) 
to be offered a job in Amsterdam, working for a multinational company. You relocated from 
Edinburgh to Amsterdam in 2012, and most of your family continues to reside in Scotland. You take a 
great interest in the Scottish independence referendum on 18 September 2014, when voters will be 
asked whether Scotland should ‘become an independent country’, and are concerned about its 
ramifications. If Scotland votes to stay part of the UK, you intend to vote from abroad in the UK 
general election in May 2015. The Scottish government pronounces that, if Scotland becomes 
independent, you will be automatically considered a Scottish citizen. Yet, in the referendum itself, you 
will not have your say: Scottish-born expatriates are excluded. In this kick-off contribution, I make the 
case for resemblance between the category of persons entitled to participate in an independence 
referendum and the initial citizen-body of a new state created by such a referendum. 
The scope of my claim concerns only independence referendums which may result in ‘Succession 
of States’. This term is defined in Article 2 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on 
Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States as ‘the replacement of one state 
by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory’.  
Independence referendums may result in the dissolution of an existing state, namely ‘[w]hen a 
State dissolves and ceases to exist and the various parts of the territory of the predecessor State form 
two or more successor States’ (Article 22); see, for instance, the breakup of Czechoslovakia (albeit 
without referendums). More commonly, perhaps, independence referendums may lead to 
the separation of part(s) of the territory of a predecessor state while the latter state continues to exist; 
recent examples include the two (unsuccessful) independence referendums in Quebec, as well as the 
cases of the Republic of South Sudan, and Timor-Leste. Scotland is the most pressing case thought to 
conform to the latter definition (see e.g. James Crawford and Alan Boyle, Referendum on the 
Independence of Scotland: International Law Aspects and House of Lords, Constitutional 
Committee, Scottish Independence: Constitutional Implications of the Referendum). 
Article 1 of the ILC Draft Articles stipulates that ‘[e]very individual who, on the date of the 
succession of States, had the nationality of the predecessor State, irrespective of the mode of 
acquisition of that nationality, has the right to the nationality of at least one of the States concerned 
[predecessor and/or successor]’. In the event of dissolution, all citizens of a predecessor state are 
affected by a successful referendum, whereas in separation cases the legal status of many citizens of a 
predecessor state may not be affected. 
A previous debate in this forum concerning electoral rights of ‘second country nationals’ in their 
EU state of residence provides a helpful context for normative questions posed in relation to the link 
between citizenship and the franchise. Notably, this debate concerns political membership 
and electoral participation in an existing political unit. Independence referendums are different: they 
may create new political entities, and require the attribution (as per the terminology employed by the 
ILC Draft Articles) or offer of citizenship to individuals. 
Let’s leave aside for now the moral or political legitimacy of particular independence referendums 
and indeed the legality of referendums under particular national laws (though other contributors may 
wish to engage with these issues). Instead, following Article 3 of the ILC Draft Articles, my starting 
point is arguably less demanding, namely that the ‘succession of States [is] occurring in conformity 
with international law’ (note, in this regard, the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion 
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Regarding the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo). As the 27 March 2014 
UN General Assembly resolution regarding the ‘Territorial Integrity of Ukraine’ demonstrates, when 
referendums fail to meet the above criterion, international non-recognition may ensue. 
In this introduction, my (main) point of reference is the Scottish Independence Referendum and the 
criteria for attributing citizenship on ‘day one’ of an independent Scotland. Other contributions will no 
doubt broaden the geographic scope of this debate, perhaps to Catalonia and elsewhere.  
I wish to put forward two propositions. 
The first proposition is that putative ab initio citizens of a putative state (the initial citizen-body of a 
new state), whether its nationality is attributed to them or they are given the ‘right of option’, are 
clearly stakeholders (borrowing Rainer Bauböck’s seminal characterisation) in an independence 
referendum that may bring that putative state into being. 
Moreover, as Bauböck argued (id) in support of external voting in national elections ‘[b]y virtue of 
their permanent membership, citizens have a life-long interest in the future of the polity, its survival 
and success’. The rationales for expatriate voting in national elections (in contradistinction from local 
elections) apply a fortiori to independence referendums in light of its fundamental nature and the long-
term effects of its outcome. 
Citizens enjoy internationally recognised rights, most prominently the right to return to and reside 
in their state of citizenship. This and other rights will be directly and meaningfully affected by the 
outcome of the referendum. The lives of putative citizens may be directly affected by subsequent 
electoral processes in the putative state (see e.g. the language employed by the EU Commission in 
its 29 January 2014 recommendation regarding EU citizens residing in another EU member state). In 
the context of the Scottish independence referendum, one only needs to point to uncertainties 
regarding EU membership, the UK/Irish common travel area, currency, and taxation to start 
appreciating the extent to which a ‘Yes’ vote may meaningfully affect the lives of putative Scottish 
citizens. 
The establishment of a new state whose citizenship they may hold from day one, which triggers 
this life-long interest, follows the referendum as a constitutive act. Indeed, it could be argued that, 
even if there is an inclusive franchise in national elections of an existing state, ‘[s]elf-government, 
whether direct or through representatives, begins by defining the scope of the community of the 
governed, and thus the governors as well’. As Cormac Mac Amhlaigh recently noted, the decision to 
exist as an independent political entity is a political question with a capital ‘P’: it involves an 
existential choice in the life of the nation beyond small ‘p’ politics. 
Turning to Scotland, the 2013 Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act determines 
eligibility for participation in the referendum. The Act lowers the voting age to 16, and disenfranchises 
all serving prisoners (discussed here). Crucially, the eligibility criteria do not mirror the criteria for 
participation in the UK general election, set in Section 1 of the Representation of the People Act 1985. 
According to the latter Act, UK citizens who have left the UK in the last fifteen years are eligible to 
vote in UK general election; their vote is cast in their last place of residence; for those formerly 
resident in Scotland, this means their Scottish constituency (the plausibility of the arrangements under 
this act are also questionable, not least regarding the 15 year rule challenged e.g. in the Shindler case, 
and the selective access to the national franchise that is given to qualifying Commonwealth and Irish 
citizens). 
By contrast, the franchise for the Scottish Independence referendum follows the criteria employed 
to determine eligibility for local government elections, set in Section 2 of the Representation of the 
People Act 1983. Hence, in addition to UK citizens habitually resident in Scotland, to Irish citizens, 
and to qualifying Commonwealth citizens (all of whom are also eligible to vote in general UK 
elections), EU nationals habitually resident in Scotland (see 2011 census data) are eligible to vote in 
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the referendum. UK citizens formerly resident in Scotland are excluded wherever they currently 
reside (namely in Rump-UK or elsewhere) and regardless of the duration of their absence from 
Scotland. 
I assert that the franchise in independence referendums ought to reflect the fact that the types of 
question addressed in such referendums are qualitatively different from the issues raised in elections 
for sub-units of a state, such as local government elections. Independence referendums share the 
fundamental and long-term characteristics of national elections, and their significance is enhanced by 
their capacity, from both a national and an international law perspective, to alter the legal landscape 
for individual citizens. 
The second proposition is that congruence between eligibility for participation in independence 
referendums and eligibility for citizenship ab initio is highly desirable. Under-inclusiveness (exclusion 
of putative citizens) may undermine the legitimacy of the referendum, not least for disenfranchised 
persons affected by a new legal reality. Over-inclusiveness (inclusion of persons ineligible for 
citizenship ab initio) suggests that perhaps such persons ought to be offered citizenship of that putative 
state. 
Achieving congruence is no mean feat: a putative state would have to determine ab initio citizenry 
at the time of the referendum. Indeed, beyond the category of citizens of the predecessor state 
habitually resident in the territory affected by the succession of states (who according to the 
‘presumption of nationality’ in Article 5 of the ILC Draft Articles are presumed to acquire the 
nationality of the successor state on the date of such succession), the picture is rather complex. 
As Jo Shaw helpfully noted, states have followed several models for determining their 
citizenship ab initio: the ‘zero option’ model, where citizenship was given to all permanent residents at 
the moment of independence; the ‘restored state’ model, recognising a historic statehood; the ‘mixed’ 
model, drawing on elements of each; and the ‘federal upgrading’ model, where a previous ‘republican’ 
or ‘provincial’ citizenship was upgraded to state citizenship at the moment of independence. Hence, it 
may be queried whether citizenship should be offered to all habitual residents of the putative state, 
and/or to expatriates of the predecessor state formerly residing in the successor states, regardless of the 
length of time they have been away and of their current place of residence. 
As noted above, the ILC Draft Articles distinguish between citizens of the predecessor state, who 
must be offered citizenship of at least one of the successor state(s), and citizens of third states, towards 
whom such an obligation in international law does not arise, though the provisions stipulate that the 
status of such citizens as habitual residents should not be affected by the succession of states (the latter 
issue may be particularly pertinent regarding rights of residence of citizens of other EU member states, 
were an independent Scotland to remain temporarily or long-term outside the EU). Hence, from an 
international law perspective, while a putative state could extend an offer of citizenship to such 
persons, it would not be required to do so.  
In contradistinction, the ILC Draft Articles stipulate (in Articles 22 and 24 regarding dissolution 
and separation, respectively) that citizens of a predecessor state habitually resident elsewhere who 
have ‘an appropriate legal connection’ to a successor state should be offered citizenship of that 
successor state. The ILC opted for an arguably less demanding ‘test’ than the International Court of 
Justice’s stipulation in its 1955 Nottebohm (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala) case concerning the exercise 
of protection by Lichtenstein, Nottebohm’s state of nationality. In that case, the Court held that 
‘nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of 
existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties’. The 
choice to move away from Nottebohm can be explained by the reverence of a protection-enhancing 
rights-based approach to the link between the citizen and her state. 
The ILC Draft Articles mandate that an offer of citizenship should be subject to a ‘right of choice’. 
Importantly, the choice is between two or more citizenships, most likely between retaining the 
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citizenship of a predecessor state and obtaining the citizenship of a successor state. However, while 
international law has historically been hostile to multiple citizenships (see the Preamble to the 1930 
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Related to the Conflict of Nationality Laws), it is presently 
considered to be neutral on this matter. An independent Scotland and Rump-UK may agree that their 
respective citizens may hold other nationalities, including that of the respective state north/south of the 
border. However, it takes two to tango: while the Scottish government has announced in its White 
Paper entitled ‘Scotland’s Future’ (published on 27 November 2013) its intention to follow ‘a[n] 
inclusive model of citizenship for people whether or not they define themselves as primarily or 
exclusively Scottish’, the current position of the UK government is less clear, and it is not implausible 
that putative citizens of Scotland may be forced to exercise a right of choice between obtaining 
Scottish citizenship and keeping their Rump-UK citizenship.  
Fraught with genuine difficulties as it may be, a determination of state citizenship ab initio is 
unavoidable: without entering the debate over the status in international law of the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention ‘criteria’ for statehood (a permanent population; a defined territory; government; the 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states), it may be legitimately expected that a putative 
state adopt (non-arbitrary) criteria for its ab initio citizenry. It stands to reason, then, that these criteria 
may be defined at the time of the referendum, and serve as the basis for its franchise.  
Indeed, the Scottish government agrees that determination of citizenship ab initio is required: 
Chapter Seven of the Scottish government’s White Paper offers a clear blueprint. In a helpful table, it 
stipulates under the heading ‘at the date of independence’ that ‘British citizens habitually resident in 
Scotland on day one of independence’ (projected for 24 March 2016) as well as ‘British citizens born 
in Scotland but living outside of Scotland on day one of independence’ will automatically obtain 
Scottish citizenship. In contradistinction, ‘after the date of independence’, migrants residing in 
Scotland legally and citizens of any country who have spent at least ten years living in Scotland at any 
time and have an ongoing connection with Scotland ‘may apply for naturalisation’. Intriguingly, the 
paper suggests that attribution of citizenship to children (and grandchildren) will follow a mixed 
model combining elements of ius sanguinis and ius soli. 
Set against the proposed congruence model, the franchise for the Scottish Independence 
Referendum is both under and over-inclusive. It excludes ‘British citizens born in Scotland but living 
outside of Scotland on day one of independence’, whom the Scottish government clearly considers to 
be Scottish enough to be attributed citizenship on ‘day one of independence’, that is, to be part of the 
constituent body-polity that in due course will adopt a ‘modern [written] constitution’ for Scotland 
(following a constitutional convention). Concurrently, it enfranchises some residents in Scotland: 
those who happen to be citizens of other EU member states, Irish and qualifying commonwealth 
citizens. The latter persons are, apparently, well-placed to decide whether Scotland should be an 
independent country, but that does not make them part of ‘the people of Scotland’. 
The Scottish government’s blueprint for the ab initio polity of an independent Scotland, while 
prima facie compliant with the ILC Draft Articles’ framework, is by no means immune from critique, 
which other contributors may wish to mount. Notwithstanding the question which criteria should have 
been proposed for citizenship ab initio, the claim that the determination of the franchise for the 
Scottish independence referendum was ill-conceived is underscored by the Scottish government’s 
vision of the people of an independent Scotland being so markedly different from the electorate that 
will determine in less than four months the coming into being of that polity. While in the Scottish case 
‘the deed is done’, perhaps lessons can be learnt and applied to determine the franchise in future 
independence referendums. 
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The Scottish referendum franchise: Residence or citizenship? 
Bernard Ryan* 
Introduction 
Eligibility to vote in the 18 September 2014 referendum on Scottish independence will be based on the 
franchise currently used throughout the United Kingdom for devolved and local matters. Accordingly, 
the voters will be persons resident in Scotland who are British citizens, qualifying Commonwealth 
citizens, Irish citizens, or other EU citizens. With the Scottish case in mind, Ruvi Ziegler’s kick-off 
contribution to this forum develops two propositions: that the “ab initio citizens of a putative state” are 
“stakeholders” in an independence referendum; and, that there should be “congruence” between the 
franchise for an independence referendum and the initial citizenship of a potential new state. 
As Ziegler’s contribution focuses on the Scottish case, my remarks will do so too.1 I will firstly 
point to tensions between Ziegler’s two propositions in the Scottish case. I will then suggest that the 
residence-based franchise chosen for the Scottish referendum deserves respect because it was chosen 
by the main protagonists, and is calculated to ensure the legitimacy of the referendum. At the same 
time, the content of a future Scottish citizenship law is too indeterminate to provide the basis for the 
franchise in a referendum. 
Internal tensions 
Drawing upon his wider perspective, Ziegler offers two general comments on the Scottish referendum 
franchise. His first proposition leads to the claim that 
“the franchise in independence referendums ought to reflect the fact that the types of question 
addressed in such referendums are qualitatively different from the issues raised in elections for 
sub-units of a state, such as local government elections. Independence referendums share the 
fundamental and long-term characteristics of national elections…” 
His second proposition leads to criticism of a mismatch between those eligible to vote and those 
expected to become Scottish citizens at independence. From the perspective of “congruence”, the 
franchise is under-inclusive in not providing a vote for non-residents who are British citizens who can 
expect to acquire Scottish citizenship automatically, and over-inclusive in granting a vote to other 
resident EU and Commonwealth citizens. 
It is notable that Ziegler’s two propositions with respect to the Scottish referendum franchise point 
in somewhat different directions. One tension arises from the fact that the United Kingdom does not 
confine the right to vote in parliamentary elections to British citizens, but instead extends it to resident 
Commonwealth and Irish citizens. It might be thought to follow from Ziegler’s first proposition that 
Commonwealth and Irish residents should have a vote in the referendum, as that is the position for 
United Kingdom parliamentary elections. Yet, his second proposition suggests otherwise, as these 
persons are not British citizens, and are unlikely to become Scottish citizens at independence. 
A second issue concerns votes for British citizens who are resident outside Scotland and who 
would probably acquire Scottish citizenship at independence. Ziegler’s comment about national 
elections suggests one of two answers. If the parliamentary franchise in Scotland is the reference 
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point, a vote should be available to expatriate British citizens outside the United Kingdom for up to 
fifteen years, provided they are registered in a Scottish constituency. Alternatively, if the reference 
point is the parliamentary franchise for the United Kingdom as a whole, one might conclude that 
British citizens resident in the rest of the United Kingdom should also have a vote in the first fifteen 
years. Neither approach however does enough to meet Ziegler’s test of “congruence”. That would 
suggest a vote for all British citizens who are on course for Scottish citizenship, wherever in the world 
they live, and without a requirement of residence in Scotland in the previous fifteen years. 
The actual franchise 
These tensions within Ziegler’s position show that it is one thing to set out a general position, and 
another to apply it coherently on the ground. In my view, a better approach would be to start, not from 
general principles, but from the United Kingdom’s constitutional order. 
In the absence of a written constitution for the United Kingdom, the ground rules for the 
referendum were necessarily defined in the political sphere. Despite their different views on the 
substantive question, in the Edinburgh Agreement of October 2012, the United Kingdom and Scottish 
Governments reached a consensus concerning the terms on which the referendum would take 
place.
2
 That paved the way for enabling legislation at Westminster, after the approval of both Houses 
of the United Kingdom Parliament, and of the Scottish Parliament.
3
  
In relation to the franchise, the Edinburgh Agreement provided that all persons entitled to vote in 
devolved and local elections should also have a vote in the referendum. The Agreement permitted the 
extension of the franchise to others, if that was the decision of the Scottish institutions. That option 
was then used by the Scottish Parliament to grant a right to vote in the referendum to 16 and 17 year 
olds, something which was in line with the SNP’s policy more generally, and which has specifically 
been mentioned in the Edinburgh Agreement.
4
  
A significant reason for basing eligibility to vote on the Scottish devolved franchise was that that 
franchise had been used in the 1997 devolution referendum. This argument from precedent appeared 
consistently in the consultation documents of both the Scottish and British Governments.
5
  
A second reason, offered by the Scottish Government, was that the devolved franchise made 
residence in Scotland central to the right to vote.
6
 Among its reasons for supporting a residence-based 
approach were that that principle was “internationally accepted…for constitutional referendums”, and 
that “sovereignty lies with that Scottish people”. It could equally have argued that residents, as a 
general rule, have the greatest stake in the outcome of the referendum decision. 
A further argument, put forward in the United Kingdom Government’s consultation in 2012, was 
that it was essential to start from a pre-existing franchise in order to avoid the “the perception that 
changes were being made to favour one or other outcome.”7 That argument might be thought 
especially relevant to the conferral of eligibility to vote upon some British citizens resident outside 
Scotland. Had that been done, it would have led to suggestions that voters likely to favour the Union 
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were being added, and would have risked raising doubts about the legitimacy of the referendum, with 
problematic implications in the event of a close ‘no’ vote. 
The Scottish referendum franchise was therefore arrived at through a process of constitutional 
decision-making led by the Scottish and United Kingdom Governments. That process, and the 
precedent- and residence-based outcome that it produced, are calculated to deliver a legitimate 
referendum. For these reasons, the franchise chosen must be considered robust to a critique which 
favours models based on the United Kingdom parliamentary franchise and/ or future citizenship. 
Scottish citizenship 
The discussion so far has assumed that there is an identifiable category of persons who would be what 
Ziegler terms “citizens ab initio”, from which a credible franchise could be constructed. The position 
is though more complex and indeterminate than that.
8
 The Scottish Government’s plan is that a 
Scottish citizenship law would be elaborated in the eighteen-month period of transition to 
independence which would follow a positive vote in the referendum.
9
 It is true that the Scottish 
Government outlined its own position as to the content of the citizenship law in Scotland’s Future, 
published in November 2013. But that position must be considered provisional, and anyway lacks 
detail in many respects.
10
 A franchise based on future citizenship would therefore be difficult to 
operationalise in the Scottish case. 
Consider first the two groups whom the Scottish Government’s intends would acquire citizenship 
automatically: those habitually resident in Scotland on the date of independence, and those who were 
born in Scotland, irrespective of their place of residence. Ziegler is clear that these groups should in 
principle have a right to vote in the referendum. Even in these cases, however, the post-referendum 
disposition of the British Government is a complicating factor. The current British Government has 
indicated that it might seek to withdraw British citizenship from those persons resident in Scotland at 
independence upon whom Scottish citizenship was conferred automatically.
11
 As that prospect 
crystallises in a post-referendum context, the Scottish Government and Parliament might decide to 
narrow the category of those who acquired citizenship automatically, in order to permit others to retain 
British citizenship. 
Beyond the ‘automatic’ cases, it is uncertain what Ziegler contemplates for those persons who 
would be eligible for Scottish citizenship around the time of independence, but upon whom it would 
not be conferred automatically. In his contribution, he suggests that persons given the “right of option” 
to become citizens are “stakeholders”, who ought to have a say over independence. He also hints that 
other EU and Commonwealth citizens should be normatively entitled to participate if they are “offered 
citizenship of [the] putative state.” 
Two questions of principle may be posed here. First, which kinds of “option” or “offer” are 
sufficient to bring someone within the normatively favoured group? Secondly – however the first 
question is answered – what is the justification for denying a vote to some persons who are residents 
but who are not eligible for citizenship (or not eligible in the right way)? Ziegler does not offer a clear 
position on either of these points. 
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In the Scottish case, there is in any event uncertainty as to who would have an option over Scottish 
citizenship around the time of independence. For example, Scotland’s Future stated that any person 
with “a parent or grandparent who qualifie[d] for Scottish citizenship” could register as a Scottish 
citizen – but it is unclear how many generations that would cover, or how it would apply to those born 
before independence. Scotland’s Future also recognised that persons of “good character” would be 
able to naturalise through residence in Scotland, but neither the qualifying period(s) nor any other 
requirements were specified. A further ill-defined possibility is that others could naturalise if they had 
“spent at least ten years living in Scotland at any time”, and had an “ongoing connection” to it. 
Finally, it is possible that some British citizens might be free to decline automatic Scottish citizenship: 
this was accepted in outline in Scotland’s Future, but the details would depend upon the interaction of 
British and Scottish law at the time of independence. 
Final thoughts 
In conclusion, I found Ziegler’s attempt to devise a general theory of entitlement to vote in 
independence referendums admirable, rather than compelling. In the Scottish case, Ziegler’s approach 
runs up against the enduringly pragmatic character of the United Kingdom’s constitutional 
arrangements. The right to vote is not generally limited to British citizens, even for parliamentary 
elections. The constitutional architecture gave the flexibility to the two main protagonists to agree 
upon a precedent and residence-based approach to the franchise. Equally, the content of a Scottish 
citizenship law remains uncertain, and would not be defined until after a referendum vote. 
Viewed in the abstract, it may make sense to class an independence referendum as a ‘national’ 
matter and/or to aim for the equation of the franchise with a future citizenship. The lesson I would 
draw for other cases, however, is that it may be difficult to apply that approach in a real situation. This 
will be especially true if there are many non-citizen residents with a legitimate expectation – based on 
precedent - of a say over independence. 
 
 9 
Regional citizenship and self-determination 
Rainer Bauböck* 
In his kickoff contribution, Ruvi Ziegler argues that those who would become citizens on ’day one’ of 
an independent Scotland should also be enfranchised in the referendum that will decide whether or not 
Scotland will become independent.  
Ziegler suggests that “putative ab initio citizens of a putative state (the initial citizen-body of a new 
state), whether its nationality is attributed to them or they are given the ‘right of option’, are clearly 
stakeholders … in an independence referendum that may bring that putative state into being.” Since I 
have defended a stakeholder principle for determining who should be offered citizenship and the 
franchise (Bauböck 2009), I need to explain why I disagree with Ziegler’s proposition. I arrive at the 
same conclusion as Bernard Ryan, whose objections are based on legal norms and pragmatic reasons. 
My argument will instead be based on democratic principles that I consider as normatively coherent 
and attractive even if they are not fully recognised by current laws, academic scholars or political 
actors. 
The short version of my objection is that independent states and autonomous regions within states 
are polities of different kinds. What it means to be a citizen in a polity depends not only on whether a 
person has a genuine link to that polity, but also on its nature. The Scottish referendum will decide 
whether the nature of the Scottish polity will be radically changed by transforming it from a self-
governing region within the UK into an independent state. The outcome of this decision must not be 
preempted by enfranchising those who would become citizens of an independent Scotland. Instead, the 
only legitimate franchise is the existing one for Scotland as an autonomous territory of the UK.  
Consider first the puzzle why UK citizens who are born and reside in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland do not have a vote in the referendum. They are certainly stakeholders in the UK-wide polity. If 
Scotland became independent, this polity would be quite radically changed. Isn’t an independence 
referendum exactly the kind of constitutional transformation in which all citizens have to be 
enfranchised, including those living permanently abroad, as David Owen has cogently argued (Owen 
2010)? Ziegler points out how “a ‘Yes’ vote affects the lives of putative Scottish citizens" on Scottish 
independence. But doesn’t it at least equally affect the lives of citizens in what has somewhat 
prematurely been labelled rUK (the rest of the UK). Without Scotland on board, it is more likely that 
Conservative governments will stay in power in London and that a future referendum on UK 
membership in the EU will result in Brixit. Why is this not enough to give them a vote in the 
referendum?  
One answer is that if independence depends on a majority of all British citizens voting for it, then 
Scotland has of course no effective right to self-determination, since its residents will be outvoted by 
an overwhelming majority of rUK citizens. This leads to the crucial follow-up question: why does 
Scotland have a right to self-determination that excludes votes from UK in the first place?  
Legally, the answer to this question is clear: because Westminster has accepted that Scotland can 
decide unilaterally on its territorial status. The Scottish right to self-determination has thus been 
agreed to by democratically elected representatives of both sides in the dispute: the British and the 
Scottish governments. This is a rare case. More frequent are conflicts in which the central government 
denies the right to self-determination of an autonomous territory, as the Spanish government currently 
does in response to Catalan demands for an independence referendum. The fact that the Spanish 
constitution rules out unilateral self-determination by any part of the “indivisible Spanish nation” does 
not settle the matter from the democratic perspective. If Scots can unilaterally determine the future 
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status of their territory, why shouldn’t Catalans have the same right? In other words, in the absence of 
a consensus, what else could ground a right of self-determination through a democratic vote?  
The case of Kosovo provides an answer to this question. Unilateral secession from a state can be 
legitimate if the central government of a state violates fundamental rights of the inhabitants of a 
province, abolishes their previous rights of self-government or tries to change the demographic basis 
of their autonomy through ethnic cleansing and settlement policies. Self-determination becomes then a 
remedial right that can be exercised against the will of the central government. 
I do not think that self-determination claims in Catalonia, Quebec, Flanders and other provinces 
that enjoy robust autonomy qualify as remedial. This does not settle the issue since it is possible to 
argue that the Madrid, Ottawa and Brussels governments ought to consent to self-determination 
referendums for the same pragmatic reasons as London. In Quebec two such referendums were held in 
1980 and 1995 and in 1998 the Supreme Court of Canada stated that, although Quebec does not have a 
right to self-determination under international law or the Canadian Constitution, the federal 
government would have to enter negotiations if another referendum resulted in “a clear majority vote 
in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession.”12 I leave it to other contributors to further 
explore such non-consensual and non-remedial cases and will instead focus on how this distinction 
bears on the first question asked in this forum debate: Should the franchise in independence 
referendums depend on whether self-determination is remedial or consensual?  
Where an independence referendum is clearly remedial, as the one held in 1991 in Kosovo in 
response to Milosevic’s abolition of Kosovo autonomy was, the solution proposed by Ziegler seems 
the right one. When a constitutionally guaranteed right of a political community to self-government is 
abolished, those who would become citizens of an independent state should have the right to decide on 
whether they support this outcome. There are several qualifiers to this proposition: it may be 
practically difficult to create a voter registry that includes those driven into exile some time ago, 
especially in a situation where a central government tries to prevent the referendum from happening. 
And even a remedial right to self-determination does not imply a right to exclude residents from the 
franchise and future citizenship on ethnic or other discriminatory grounds. If secessionists claim 
jurisdiction over a certain territory, they must grant the franchise and future citizenship to all 
legitimate residents in this territory – which still allows for the exclusion of recent settlers brought in 
to change the demographic composition of the population. But the normative reason remains clear: the 
decision about the future independence of a region need not be taken exclusively by those previously 
enfranchised in regional elections, if there is no more effective regional self-government and 
citizenship as a legitimate basis for this franchise. 
Whereas remedial self-determination involves a decision whether to replace an abolished regional 
citizenship with citizenship in an independent state, consensual self-determination involves a decision 
whether to upgrade an existing regional citizenship into that of an independent state. And this 
decision should be taken by those who are currently voting citizens of the region. It seems to me 
illegitimate to preempt the outcome of such a decision by enfranchising putative citizens who do not 
have a right to vote in regional elections now and who will also not gain a future right to vote in case 
of a ‘No’ outcome. My concern is not how enfranchising persons born in Scotland who reside in 
London, Brussels or Boston would affect the referendum result. It may well be that a majority of these 
putative Scottish citizens would prefer Scotland to remain in the UK so that they do not risk losing 
their EU passports. I am raising a principled objection: The putative demos of an independent Scotland 
should not replace the existing demos of Scotland as part of the UK in a decision about independence 
because currently only the latter but not the former can be considered as democratically legitimate. 
This brings me to the second question asked in this forum: Who should be the citizens of newly 
independent states? Our previous discussion would be pointless if the answer were: exactly the same 
                                                     
12
 Cf. re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.  
Regional citizenship and self-determination 
11 
as the current regional citizens. But regions and independent states are polities of different kinds and 
their membership rules differ accordingly. All citizenship laws of independent democratic states are 
based on birthright (i.e. some mixture of ius soli and ius sanguinis) and provisions for naturalisation 
and voluntary renunciation of citizenship. These rules create often large discrepancies between 
residents and citizens with significant numbers of non-resident citizens and non-citizen residents. By 
contrast, the citizens of autonomous regions in democratic states are in most cases the citizens of the 
wider state who take up residence in the region. There is no birthright, naturalisation, or renunciation, 
and thus also no external citizenship that would allow emigrants originating in the region who do not 
maintain a residence there to cast votes in regional elections.  
The Scottish case is slightly unusual because the franchise in Scottish Parliament elections includes 
not only British, Irish and qualifying Commonwealth citizens who can also vote in Westminster 
elections, but even citizens of other EU member states. As Ziegler points out, the latter would not 
automatically become Scottish citizens in case of independence but would have to opt in through 
naturalisation. Is this a problem for the legitimacy of the Scottish referendum? I do not think so. It is 
certainly not illegitimate for a region to extend its citizenship to residents who are not citizens of the 
larger state. We find this extension in local elections in fourteen European states where the franchise is 
granted to all residents independently of their nationality. If all of the currently enfranchised citizens 
of Scotland as a region of the UK have a legitimate vote in regional elections, it would be wrong to 
exclude them from the decision on a fundamental change of the territorial status of the region. 
Who should then become citizens of an independent Scotland? On this point, I do not have any 
major disagreement with Ziegler’s helpful discussion of international legal norms for initial 
determination of citizenship in case of state succession or with the respective proposals in the Scottish 
government’s White Paper. What we need to understand is that these norms address the specific task 
of setting up a birthright citizenship regime for a newly independent state that necessarily differs from 
whatever rules had previously existed within an autonomous region. Just as we must distinguish the 
initial collective determination of automatically included citizens on day one of an independent state 
from the ongoing individual determination under a regular citizenship law, so we ought to distinguish 
existing regional citizenship from initial determination at independence. Independence referendums 
are procedures that provide democratic legitimacy to the transition from regional to independent-state 
citizenship. But they must not blur this distinction. If the moral basis for self-determination exercised 
in this way is consent rather than remedial justice, then the vote belongs to the regional citizens who 
should decide on whether they want to change their region’s status through secession.  
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A Matter of legitimacy? 
Dimitrios Kyritsis* 
Democratic rule aspires to an ideal of universal political participation. Within national political 
communities, this ideal has historically manifested itself in a demand for the extension of the 
franchise. But outside that framework the ideal is fraught with ambiguity.  
One of these ambiguities concerns procedures that aim to establish a national political community 
from scratch, as illustrated by debates about the franchise in the Scottish independence referendum. As 
things stand, if you were born and grew up in Scotland but reside elsewhere, say in England, you do 
not have a right to vote in the referendum. This is so despite the fact that, were Scotland to become 
independent, the Scottish government has committed to granting you citizenship ab initio. I do not 
doubt that the interests of political expediency and national myth-making might recommend that the 
franchise be extended to you. But it strikes me that no duty is breached if this does not happen. In his 
kick-off contribution, Ruvi Ziegler claims otherwise. He not only contends that giving the right to vote 
to potential ab initio citizens who are non-residents is ‘highly desirable’ but that not doing so ‘may 
undercut the legitimacy of the referendum’. The latter statement suggests that, for Ziegler, something 
in the vicinity of a mandatory norm will have been breached. Here, I shall offer some arguments 
against this thesis.  
Ziegler advances two reasons for his view. First, he says, we ought to extend the franchise to all 
potential ab initio citizens because independence referendums ‘meaningfully and directly’ affect their 
legal options. Granted, this feature of independence referendums may serve to distinguish them from 
political procedures that have no similarly momentous effect. But the principle that we ought to 
participate in all the political decisions that profoundly affect us is not a sound one. That principle 
would give Venezuelan citizens a say in US energy policy, for instance. It would require that (many) 
citizens of Central American states participate in the design of US immigration policy. Notice that in 
both examples US policy is foisted upon someone. The situation is markedly better for those potential 
ab initio citizens of an independent Scotland who are not eligible to vote in the referendum. According 
to the ILC Draft Articles, they must be given the right to accept or reject Scottish citizenship. Thus, if 
the principle is not valid in the case of the Venezuelans, surely it cannot be for the disenfranchised 
Scots-to-be. That is not to say that the latter have an easy choice to make. Some of them may face the 
dilemma of trading one nationality for another. Still, there is no general duty to give people easy 
choices, especially when those choices basically add new - morally permissible - options to the ones 
that existed before.  
Second, Ziegler maintains that the extension is required to remedy the mismatch between the group 
of people who will decide on independence and the group of ab initio citizens. Arguably, the 
mismatch smacks of arbitrariness, and arbitrariness is the kind of thing that ‘undercuts’ political 
legitimacy. But it is not clear why this particular mismatch is arbitrary in a sense that is crucial for 
legitimacy. Consider a restriction on the right to vote in the referendum along racial lines. What makes 
it illegitimate is its illicit ground. Ziegler owes us an analogous argument. Perhaps he thinks that the 
status of ab initio citizenship is a sufficient (though not necessary) condition for the right to vote on 
independence. I beg to differ. If anything, it is those who will become systematically subject to the 
coercive force of the new state from day one just by virtue of their residence that have the most 
pressing interest to decide on independence, whether they will be citizens or not. Conversely, for the 
non-residents who can become ab initio citizens, this status is - given their right to choose - little more 
than some sort of premium membership. You can throw in the right to vote if you want, but you don’t 
have to.  
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Where do these arguments leave us? Even if I am right that Ziegler does not dent the legitimacy of 
the Scottish independence referendum, his proposal touches on an important issue. Ours is a world of 
states whose existence, boundaries and membership (not to mention relative wealth and power) are to 
a large extent the product of force and historical contingency. This raises a host of challenges, which 
we encounter time and again in debates about immigration, global justice, humanitarian intervention, 
the obligation to obey the law and so forth. Understandably, we want to ensure that at least new states 




Who votes in a referendum? General comments and some facts concerning Québec 
Guy Laforest and Eric Montigny* 
In critical essays on constitutional referendums, Patrick Taillon and Stephen Tierney have argued that 
the crucial difficulty is to identify the People, the Demos.
1
 In other words, the first question is to 
determine who is substantively concerned by the ballot question (who are the legitimate stakeholders, 
as argued by Rainer Bauböck in his own commentary in this forum). In light of its own experience 
with referendums, Québec is a good case study. The aim of this contribution is to comment on some of 
the larger issues debated by Ruvi Ziegler and others in this forum, and further to explain the rules that 
are currently in place in Québec on voter eligibility. 
General comments 
On matters of referendums, consistent normative logic does not always work. To give but one example 
from the current debate, Rainer Bauböck in his own contribution recalls that, beyond the issue of the 
franchise, unilateral secession can be rendered legitimate if the central government of a state has 
violated the fundamental rights of the inhabitants of the seceding province or abolished their previous 
rights to self-government. Sometimes, reality can be more complex. It is possible to imagine a 
situation whereby the central government has substantially reduced, rather than abolished, the rights to 
self-government of the inhabitants of the seceding jurisdiction. Context, here, would require further 
normative reflections. On the issue of the franchise at the heart of the current debate, our core 
argument is as follows: gaining consensus between central and sub-state government is more 
important than maintaining consistency between pre- and post- independence enfranchisement. 
Ruvi Ziegler, examining the Scottish case, argues that those who will be offered Scottish 
citizenship after independence should also be entitled to vote in the referendum in which the matter 
will be decided. He argues on the side of normative clarity and consistency. Bernard Ryan replies by 
siding with the pragmatic political and constitutional arrangements at work in the United Kingdom, 
which apply to the upcoming Scottish referendum the rules allowing European Union and 
Commonwealth citizens to vote at devolved and local elections. In the end, we believe that 
consistency between past and present democratic rules should prevail in this case over consistency 
about matters as they stand and democratic citizenship rules for the future. Rainer Bauböck makes a 
similar point in his comment, arguing that the rules guiding normal sub-state elections in Scotland 
should also apply to an independence referendum. However, the foundations of his reasoning are 
different from ours. Bauböck starts from the idea that the sub-state demos is substantially different 
from the demos of an independent state, before moving to the issue of consistency. We would rather 
argue that the most important dimension, on the issue of the franchise and on many others, has to do 
with the existence of an overall agreement between the British and Scottish governments, arrived at on 
15 October 2012. Concerning independence referendums, nothing is more important than reciprocal 
consent and respect between the existing state and secessionist authorities. At least in part for reasons 
of consistency, we believe that the provision allowing young people, 16 and 17 years of age, to vote in 
the upcoming Scottish referendum, is wrong. This is, however, the kind of inconsistency we can live 
with because it was one element in the contours of the compromise between British and Scottish 
authorities. We will reformulate our core argument after having looked at the case of Québec. 
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Referendums in Québec and the electoral system 
Over time, Quebeckers have experienced different types of referendums (always non-binding, 
following the logic of Westminster-based parliamentary democracy); three were initiated by the 
Canadian federal parliament and four by their own legislature. The two most famous ones dealt with 
sovereignty-association in 1980 and with sovereignty-partnership in 1995. 
As citizens of the Canadian federal state residing in the province of Québec, Quebeckers are 
entitled to vote at both regional and national levels
2
. Jurisdiction over the electoral process is shared by 
both levels of government, under the umbrella of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court of 
Canada which sits as Canada’s final court of appeal. 
Two main laws stemming from the National Assembly of Québec govern the electoral system in 
the province. Adopted in 1978, the Québec Referendum Act is still in force. It includes provisions 
regarding the obligations to form a Yes and a No ‘camp’, to establish a Referendum Council, and to 
regulate financing. For other matters, such as the eligibility to vote, the Referendum Act refers to the 
Québec Election Act. 
Qualified electors 
According to the Québec Election Act, mentioned above, in order to be able to vote in a referendum in 
Québec, one has to be a qualified elector. The act applies age (18 years) and Canadian citizenship 
requirements. 
To be a qualified elector, one must also have been domiciled in Québec for six months. For most 
electors, this is easy to demonstrate. This provision could face interpretive difficulties for newcomers 
or for students born elsewhere in Canada. The domicile of a person is the domicile established under 
the Québec Civil Code.
3
 It means that it has to be one’s main address and that this person has 
expressed in practice her or his intention to consider it as such. A debate on the status of residency, 
initiated by McGill University students, occurred in Court before the 2014 election. Most of the cases 
submitted to the Court were rejected. Moreover, one year after the referendum of 1995, students of 
Bishop University were found guilty of voting without being Québec residents. Robert Ghiz, currently 
Premier of Prince Edward Island, was studying at Bishop University at the time and admitted to voting 
in the 1995 referendum. In that respect, a person who is deprived of voting rights pursuant to Québec 
laws (Election Act, the Referendum Act, the Act respecting elections and referendums in 
municipalities or the Act respecting school elections) is not allowed to vote. 
A permanent list of electors 
Since 1995, Québec has chosen to put in place a permanent list of electors. This list consists of the 
information contained in the register of electors and the register of territories. According to the 
Election Act, this information shall include the name, domicile-based address, gender and date of birth 
of each elector. 
The information relating to electors is updated on the basis of the information transmitted to the 
Chief Electoral Officer. This information could come directly from electors, from the school boards, 
the Public Curator, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada and the Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration of Canada. In practice, it comes essentially from the Régie de l'assurance-maladie du 
Québec. This agency has to notify the Chief Electoral Officer of any change in the name, address, date 
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of birth or gender of a person whose name is entered on the permanent list of electors, as well as the 
date of the person's death. The same applies for a person who has informed the Régie that he or she 
has acquired Canadian citizenship or who is about to reach 18 years of age, at least six months before 
the person's eighteenth birthday. 
Alternative voting procedures and voting outside Québec 
The Québec Electoral Act provides many different ways for electors to express their vote beyond the 
regular practice of voting in one’s residential neighborhood. First, electors can vote at the returning 
officer's main office or branch offices. Second, the practice of early voting is gaining in popularity.
4
 
Since 2014, it is possible to vote on the campus of a vocational training centre or a post-secondary 
educational institution. Finally, postal voting is permitted. The latter method is available to electors 
who are incarcerated but also to electors residing outside Québec. The latter case is crucial to our 
current discussion. 
Voting by electors residing outside Québec was in force for both the 1992 and 1995 referendums. 
Electors that register to vote outside Québec were deemed to be domiciled at their Québec address. 
They had to demonstrate that they had left Québec temporarily after being domiciled in Québec for 12 
months. They were able to vote outside Québec for two years after their date of departure. 
This two-year limit did not apply to an elector, and her or his spouse, posted outside Québec 
working for the governments of Québec or Canada, or to an employee of an international organisation 
of which Québec or Canada is a member and to which it pays a contribution. An elector who wished to 
vote outside Québec had to file and sign a request including the following elements: name, sex and 
date of birth; domiciled address in Québec or last domiciliary address in Québec; date of departure 
from Québec; projected date of return to Québec; and postal address outside Québec. In addition, the 
person had to complete a declaration stating that he or she intended to return to Québec. 
As shown in table 1, no more than 3,000 electors registered to vote outside Québec in the 1992 
referendum. In 1995, 15,000 electors registered. Their participation rate was close to 80% in both 
referendums. 
 
Referendum of 1992 1995 
Number of constituencies 124 125 
Number of electors 3,086 14,818 
Yes option 1,343 2,533 
No option 1,089 9,016 
Number of valid votes 2,432 11,549 
Number of rejected votes 32 168 
Total of votes 2,464 11,717 
Participation rate 79,8% 79,1% 
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Conclusion 
Since 1980, Québec’s democracy has experienced three referendums on its constitutional future. The 
Referendum Act and Election Act are permissive regarding eligibility. If one is a Canadian citizen, 
one can vote even if one has been a resident for only six months. Postal voting is also available for 
electors residing temporarily outside Québec. Nevertheless, to be a qualified voter, one must 
demonstrate that one has the will to contribute to the future of Québec and to be a member of the 
political community. In summary, one has to be a Quebecker, and this notwithstanding a temporary 
residence outside Québec. For normal elections and for referendums, those are the rules of the game.  
However, the legal and normative rules of the game are not everything in matters of referendums. 
Issues of political culture, dimensions related to the existence of a form of mutual respect and trust, 
however thin and limited, between key players, are of fundamental importance. At the time of the two 
secession referendums in Québec, there was no such trust and respect between the governing 
authorities of Québec and of Canada.
5
 This is the greatest difference between the current Scotland-UK 
case on the one hand, the past Québec-Canada case and the current stalemate in Catalonia-Spain on 
the other hand. The politics of referendums requires consistency and as much consent as possible in 
the circumstances. 
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A Catalan perspective: franchise in a forbidden referendum 
Jaume López* 
My contribution to this debate will offer what might be called "a Catalan perspective" in light of the 
impending 9 November 2014 vote on the political future of that region/nation. 
Let me note at the outset that I agree with Rainer Bauböck’s position on the question who should 
vote in a referendum on the political future of a region or stateless nation (which includes the decision 
whether or not to become an independent state). Persons who participate in the regional elections of 
the territory that aims to change their political status should vote, not potential future citizens of a 
possible new state. 
I agree with his reasoning, and I think it could be also applied to a referendum on the future of 
Catalonia, even if it is neither a classic case of remedial self-determination, nor of a consensual one. I 
do think it is a question about upgrading the status of a polity, for the question in Catalonia is a double 
one: 1) Do you want Catalonia to become a state (which can include a federal or confederal relation 
in/within Spain); 2) If the first question is answered affirmatively: Do you want Catalonia to become 
an independent state? The present autonomy can thus be upgraded in different ways. I also think that it 
has remedial features, for only the continuous negative response of the Spanish state to federal reform 
and its failure of recognition of the Catalan identity explain the massive increase in support for a 
referendum and also for independence (about the 50% of the Catalan population, see here). In Albert 
Hirschman's terms, the Catalonian voice has repeatedly been ineffective in bringing about reform and 
this has strengthened the exit option (Hirschman 1970). 
The inclusion of two questions locates the Catalan case in between an internal self-determination 
process that would create a federal state and an external one that would create an independent state. 
The right to decide as a vague concept has played the main role in all the social and political demands. 
It has been at the centre of some of the most important demonstrations ever held in Catalonia. From 
my point of view we cannot simply equate an external right to self-determination with a right to 
decide. I think that the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo's 
independence provides a better theoretical and legal basis for this new concept of the right to decide. I 
disagree on this point with Bauböck. Although it is true that Kosovo was a case of remedial secession, 
the ICJ opinion offers three exhaustive bases of legitimation: non-productive negotiations, democracy, 
and peaceful ways, all of which are clearly present in the case of Catalonia. The Catalan sovereignty 
demands can be better understood as a right of the present demos to decide on its future rather than as 
a more traditional right to self-determination of peoples and nations. But this is certainly another 
debate. 
Is the view defended by Bauböck the one that is going to be applied in Catalonia in order to define 
who is entitled to vote in the upcoming referendum? Possibly not. ‘Possibly’, because Catalonia has 
not yet adopted legislation defining who will be able to vote in the impending referendum. ‘Not’, 
because a draft bill was tabled on 16 July 2014 with a view to a parliamentary debate in the Catalan 
Parliament at September, and this draft bill does not draw a clear distinction between regional voters 
and future citizens. 
The fact that, four months before such an important referendum, enabling legislation has not yet 
been passed by the Catalan Parliament reflects in part the particularity of the Catalan sovereignty 
process. At present, it is unclear whether a referendum will be held, in view of the Spanish 
government’s objection which it has repeatedly voiced in the Spanish parliament. The difference 
between the UK-Scotland and the Spain-Catalonia processes is remarkable and explains, in part, why 
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the Catalan Parliament wants to pass an act authorising 'political consultations'. This strange name is 
due to the fact that, the Spanish constitution reserves the power to hold referendums to the Spanish 
state, and prohibits the holding of referendums by regional governments, including Catalonia’s. On 8 
April 2014, the Spanish Parliament voted against authorising the Catalan Parliament to legislate for a 
referendum.  
Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution proclaims ‘the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the 
common and indivisible country of all Spaniards’, on the one hand, and ‘recognises and guarantees the 
right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed’, on the other hand. The 
unresolved tension between these two principles has hampered full recognition of Spain as a pluri-
national democracy. In his recent coronation speech, the new King Philip claimed that Spain is a 
'united and diverse nation', emphasizing the common idea that Spain is a nation, and not a 
multinational state. 
It is clear that the distinction between holding a consultation and holding a referendum is confusing 
and can only be explained by the current political context. On the one hand, according to the Spanish 
Catalan Statue, approved by Catalans in referendum in 2006 and amended by the Constitutional Court 
four years later, the Catalan government can develop ways to improve democracy and consultation 
with Catalans. On the other hand, according to the Spanish Constitution, only the Spanish Parliament 
can hold binding and non-binding referendums (as, for example, the 2005 referendum on the EU 
Constitutional Treaty). The question is: what does a ‘political consultation’ mean in the Spanish legal 
landscape? Is it in fact a non-binding referendum that cannot be called a referendum, but could have 
strong binding effect? This would be the case if a majority of Catalans clearly express their desire for 
Catalonia to become a new state.  
These elements affect the franchise. First, legislators must try to distinguish between a consultation 
and a referendum. Thus, the proposed eligibility for participation in the November consultation is not 
based on the general electoral register (which is ‘owned’ by the Spanish government), but on a new 
register that draws from all the municipal registers, basing the franchise on residence rather than 
citizenship. In addition, persons above the age of 16 will be able to vote, whereas in constitutionally 
regulated referendums and representative elections only those who are 18 years or older are entitled to 
vote.  
Furthermore, according to the draft bill, apart from regional electors (Spanish citizens ordinarily 
resident in Catalonia), citizens of other EU states resident in Catalonia for more than a year and 
registered therein would be eligible to vote, whereas citizens of non-EU states must satisfy a three 
years registration period from the day they have obtained a residence permit in Catalonia. Catalans 
residing abroad may vote in the consultation if they register in a voluntary registry, while Catalans 
who live and are registered in the rest of Spain will not be able to vote. Catalan MPs may have been 
inspired by the arrangements made for the Scottish referendum. Drawing a distinction between 
residents (the requirement of one or three years’ residence) based on their nationality (EU/non-EU) 
seems very questionable. 
I would argue that the proposed franchise is fundamentally mistaken. On the one hand, it seems 
clear that the nature of a vote on the political future of Catalonia (which includes the possibility of 
independence) is very different from other types of referendums. On the other hand, it makes no sense 
that someone who cannot vote for the regional parliament can decide if Catalonia should change its 
present status. 
Although there is no Catalan citizenship as such, the legal status of Catalans is clearly defined in 
Article 7 of the Spanish Catalan Statute: ‘1. Spanish citizens legally resident in Catalonia benefit from 
the political status of Catalans or citizens of Catalonia. Their political rights are exercised in 
accordance with this Statute and the law. 2. Spanish citizens resident abroad whose last legal place of 
residence was Catalonia also enjoy, as Catalans, the political rights defined by this Statute; their 
descendants, who maintain this citizenship, shall also enjoy these rights, if they so request, in the 
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manner determined by law.’ Article 7 defines who is entitled to vote in the regional elections. In other 
words, the Catalan demos. Not the Catalan nation. Not putative citizens of a Catalan state. It is this 
demos which should have the possibility to vote on any upgrading of the current status as an 




Polish migrants in Scotland 
Derek McGhee and Emilia Pietka-Nykaza* 
The Scottish Independence referendum is a historic event, as an independence referendum being held 
in an existing EU member state is unprecedented (Shaw 2013: 13). Independence referendums are 
unlike other sub-national elections, as they address questions that as Ziegler notes in this Forum ‘are 
qualitatively different from the issues raised in elections for sub-units of a state’. The fact that the 
outcome of the referendum could disrupt Scotland's and the UK's continuing EU membership is of 
particular concern for EU migrants living in Scotland. We will return to concerns over continuing EU 
membership and other related issues (including the link between sub-national election rights and 
naturalization) at the end of the contribution.  
This contribution primarily concerns a particular aspect of what Bauböck (2005) might call EU 
migrants’ sense of having ‘a stake’, or being ‘stakeholders’. Thus, we examine how some of the Post-
Accession
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 perceive their eligibility to vote in this referendum. What we were 
particularly struck by in our interviews was the number of our participants who referred to their 
inclusion as eligible voters in this referendum either as a privilege or as a burden. Both of these 
perceptions offer opportunities for deepening our appreciation of the experience of being a 
‘stakeholder alien’ in this historic referendum. 
The participants who perceived their voting rights as a burden struggled with the decision whether 
to vote in the referendum. There were two main reasons that a number of our participants gave for this 
contemplation. The first reason was related to the question whether migrants in Scotland have a moral 
right to vote and decide about independence of a nation state they are not citizen of. The second reason 
was that migrants did not want to exercise a right that might contribute to an outcome that their hosts 
might not desire. Thus, their response was a matter of taking on the role of the considerate guest who 
does not want to be seen to be abusing their host's kindness and hospitality: 
“I know that I have a right take part in referendum, but do I have a moral right to do so? (…) If 
someone is asking about my personal opinion whether Scotland should be independent, I would 
say no, I think it should remain in the UK. But if someone is asking me do I feel that I should 
decide after 7 years of living in this country? I think I don’t. I think I won’t be voting because I 
can contribute to the decision that could make them [Scots] unhappy.” 
Jan, age 57, warehouse worker, Glasgow  
In a sense, participants such as Jan are exhibiting a sophisticated understanding akin to Derrida's 
(2000a, 2000b, 2005) insistence on the impossibility of 'pure' or 'absolute' hospitality. For Derrida, 
hospitality is precarious and conditional. That is, conditional on the host’s continuing favourable 
attitude to their guest(s). As well as exposing the migrants' perception of the precariousness of 
hospitality, Jan is also articulating what Richard Sennett calls a code of honour. Following Bourdieu, 
Sennett considers honour to suppose that 'an individual who sees himself through the eyes of others, 
who has need of others for his existence, because the image he has of himself is indistinguishable from 
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 Post-accession migrants are the citizens of the eight countries that joined the EU in 2004 (the Czech, Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).  
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 According to the 2011 Census for Scotland, the number of Polish migrants living in Scotland was 55,231. See National 
Records for Scotland.  
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 This was a small-scale mostly qualitative study. We do not intend to generalise findings, nor do we claim that outcomes 
are representative of all Polish migrants in Scotland. We conducted an online survey, 250 participants completed the 
survey between April-June 2014, and 24 individual in-depth interviews with Polish Adults, 12 in Glasgow and 12 in 
Edinburgh, between May and June 2014. We anonymised the names of all participants. 
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that presented to him by other people' (Bourdieu, in Sennett 2003: 55). In this context, being 
honourable and honouring the host is an expression of gratitude which acknowledges a conditional 
welcome and the risks of appearing ungrateful (to one’s host), as such gratitude has ‘survival value’ 
(Komter 2005: 57). From Jan's perspective, his decision not to vote is in a cycle of gift (the vote) and 
counter-gift (deciding not to vote) that from Jan’s perspective is essential in sustaining social ties and 
social cohesion (Komter 2005: 57) in his adopted country.  
In contrast, other participants viewed their inclusion in the referendum as a more straightforward 
and unconditional gift or privilege. That is, as something Scotland has given EU migrants voluntarily 
without them asking or demanding this right. For a number of participants, this gift or privilege was 
seen as ‘form of gesture’ and recognition of migrants’ presence and contribution to hosts 
communities.  
“I think it’s a form of gesture and a way of showing one’s trust, because, on one hand, I think if 
one has lived here for a number of years, one should be considered a citizen of this country (…). I 
think it was a very valid and positive gesture, because no matter how you look at it, the immigrants 
who come here not only join the army of labour but also settle down here and contribute to the 
economy, plan their lives here and shape the culture of the country, and so I think they should 
totally have the right to vote as well.” 
Marta, 28, Web developer, Glasgow 
The gift or privilege of being eligible to take part in the referendum was also associated with the need 
to reciprocate, 'give back'. This sentiment was expressed by Anna: 
“I feel that taking part in referendum is my privilege because I am not a citizen of this country. In 
Poland this is my duty, but here this is my privilege (…) the implications of this referendum are 
huge, thus this is huge decision. Because I’m eligible to vote I want to learn and know more and 
be able to decide wisely and responsively.” 
Anna, 42, Teacher of German language, Glasgow 
Here, the perception of Marta's and Anna’s right to vote in the referendum is regarded 'as a sign of 
honour, respect, and appreciation' (Komter 2005: 45). This was articulated by another participant thus:  
“…it makes me feel appreciated that Scots decided that because I live in this country I am eligible 
to take part in the referendum.” 
Marek Psychotherapist, 44, Edinburgh 
There are some similarities between the Polish Migrants who have decided to honour or show respect 
to their hosts through not voting, and others who feel 'honoured' by what they perceive as the gifted 
privilege (rather than the right) to vote in the referendum. Both responses feature the necessary 
ingredient of inequality in the gifting or exchange process which, from a Maussian perspective, leads 
to those who benefit from the gift wishing to give something back even if they cannot give back an 
equivalent (Wise 2009: 11). Thus, they reciprocate through voting or not voting, depending on what 
they perceive to be the proper way of honouring the gifted privilege they believe the Scots have 
bestowed on them. What is common to both responses is they want to 'do the right thing' with these 
gifts. According to Wise's reading of Mauss, these exchanges have the effect of turning people 
outward of producing a more general disposition of trust (Wise 2009: 17). Cheal takes this one step 
further when he says that the circulation of gifts underpins the moral economy, that is, a 'system of 
transactions which are defined as socially desirable (that is, moral) because through them social ties 
are recognized, and balanced social relationships are maintained' (Cheal 1988: 15 and 19). That being 
said, Jan’s response to the situation is more complex than Marta’s, Anna’s, and Marek’s. Jan did not 
want EU migrants' participation in the Scottish Independence Referendum to impact negatively on 
what he perceives to be the current pro-migration attitudes in Scotland. Jan’s response presents a 
degree of anxiety and powerlessness, which evokes the other side of the migrant experience where, 
there are concerns that conditional hospitality can turn to hostility, in the context of the unstable 
pairing of hospitality/hostility (Derrida 2000: 3).  
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Many of our participants perceive what they consider to be the potential 'strings attached' to their 
inclusion in the referendum electorate. Just as Caplow observed, in terms of interpersonal gifts, the 
majority of gifts are given in order to ascertain and fortify relationships that are deemed important but 
have not yet been stabilized (Caplow, in Komter 2005: 47). Although we have found that, for a 
number of our participants who feel the warmth of recognition, honour and being part of this historic 
process, reciprocation of the perceived gift or privilege of referendum electorate inclusion could well 
have a stabilising effect, we note that this stabilising effect in terms of the obligations and the 
compulsion to 'give something back' to Scotland for those who intend to honour the perceived 
privilege of election right inclusion by voting in the referendum was not in turn articulated in longer-
term naturalisation plans. What did emerge in our interviews was a yearning for clarification and 
certainty in the context of the uncertainty the referendum has generated for EU citizens as to what 
their status as EU citizens of an independent Scotland will be. Thus, clarification of their 'long-term 
alienage' (Shaw 2007: 70-71) was more salient than naturalisation for these particular stakeholders in 
this referendum.  
What we observed was that the Poles’ ‘stakeholdership’ as migrants did not seem to follow 
Bauböck's assumptions that limited (sub-national) voting rights should lead to naturalization by 
application (Bauböck 2005: 686).
4
 Shaw notes regarding Bauböck's definition of stakeholder citizens 
that 'long-term alienage' seems to be excluded as a possibility for migrants (Shaw 2007: 74). On the 
whole, our participants are intent on and content with remaining EU citizens living in Scotland. With 
regard to the referendum, they desire to have their legal status (in terms of rights and responsibilities) 
as EU citizens living in a potentially independent Scotland more clearly articulated in the future. 
 
                                                     
4
 According to the White Paper, applications for naturalisation will be possible for migrants who can prove they have 
resided in Scotland for ten years at any time and have an on-going connection with Scotland (Scotland's Future 2013: 
496). It may well be that for those who are resident the qualification period may be shorter, e.g. five years. 
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Scotland’s independence referendum, citizenship and residence rights: 
Identifying ‘the people’ and some implications of Kurić v Slovenia 
Jure Vidmar* 
Writing in 1956, Ivor Jennings famously stated: “On the surface…[the right of self-determination] 
seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide 
unless somebody decides who are the people” (Jennings 1956: 56). This statement can also be read 
more broadly and the question can be asked whenever we refer to the democratic ideal of decision-
making in accordance with the will of the people – who is that? Voting results can be distorted if the 
concept of the people is either too exclusive or too inclusive. Ruvi Ziegler argues that in the case of 
Scotland it is both. In contrast to Ziegler, I will argue that there are in fact two concepts of the people 
of Scotland: one for the purposes of voting in the referendum, the other one for the purposes of 
obtaining Scottish citizenship. They regulate inclusion and exclusion differently.  
To illustrate Ziegler’s point, Hamish, who has just graduated in his native Scotland, packed up his 
bagpipes and moved to Amsterdam, cannot vote at the independence referendum. Nevertheless, 
should Scotland become independent, Hamish will become its citizen. On the other hand, Slawomir, a 
Polish plumber who has recently moved to Glasgow, can vote at the referendum. Yet, even if 
Slawomir wholeheartedly supports Scotland’s independence, he will not automatically become a 
citizen of the new state. Hamish and Slawomir belong to the people of Scotland for different purposes. 
I do not think that this differentiation is a bad thing or even uncommon in international practice. I will 
discuss the Scottish identification(s) of the concept of the people in light of this practice, and also pick 
up on Ziegler’s point on the implications of the vote for EU citizenship rights. 
By reference to Jo Shaw, Ziegler mentions several models of awarding citizenship that have been 
followed in the wave of post-1990 new state creations. In the territory of Yugoslavia, for example, 
citizenship was generally extended to all permanent residents of a certain former federal republic. This 
conclusion needs to be qualified, though. Yugoslavia was a federation that also knew the concept of 
the so-called ‘internal citizenship’. The latter was not awarded territorially but by bloodline. Slovenia 
may be a particularly instructive example in light of the 2012 European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) decision in Kurić v Slovenia. I will first present possible implications of this decision for 
Scotland and then develop an argument against an overlap between the two concepts of ‘the people’ of 
Scotland.  
In the 1990 independence referendum, Slovenia enfranchised both its ‘internal citizens’, wherever 
they lived, and all permanent residents of Slovenia. The outcome was that 88.5 per cent of all those 
eligible to vote favoured independence. When Slovenia became independent, it automatically 
extended citizenship to any person who had been its ‘internal citizen’. Permanent residents were given 
the opportunity and a window in which they could opt for citizenship, but they did not acquire it 
automatically. Those who did not apply or missed the deadline were simply erased from the registry of 
permanent residents. The group of the so-called erased residents was thus created, that is, people who 
lost their previously-acquired residency rights in Slovenia.  
It was Slovenia’s argument in Strasbourg that members of this group were offered full citizenship 
rights, and that failing to take up the offer was their fault. The Court did not accept this argument and 
held in para 357: 
“[A]n alien lawfully residing in a country may wish to continue living in that country without 
necessarily acquiring its citizenship. As shown by the difficulties faced by the applicants, for many 
years, in obtaining a valid residence permit, the Slovenian legislature failed to enact provisions 
aimed at permitting former SFRY citizens holding the citizenship of one of the other republics to 
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regularise their residence status if they had chosen not to become Slovenian citizens or had failed 
to do so. Such provisions would not have undermined the legitimate aims of controlling the 
residence of aliens or creating a corpus of Slovenian citizens, or both.” 
Following this logic, once you have legally established permanent residency, you keep the right of 
residence, even if the legal status of either your home or your host state changes and, as a result of this 
change, your new citizenship status alone would no longer give you a right to residence. What matters 
is that you had the right at the moment of the change of the territorial status. It is notable that the Court 
established that non-citizen residents enjoy this guarantee under Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) (the right to private and family life) in their own right; it does not depend 
on, for example, a family relationship with a citizen of the host state.  
In the context of the Scottish referendum vote, this decision has implications for the following 
groups: (i) potential future Scottish citizens residing in rUK (the rest of the UK); (ii) potential future 
Scottish citizens residing in other EU member states; (iii) UK citizens residing in Scotland who will 
not opt for Scottish citizenship; (iv) non-UK EU citizens residing in Scotland who will not qualify or 
opt for Scottish citizenship. As I argue elsewhere, by declaring independence, Scotland would prima 
facie also exit the EU, unless negotiated otherwise (Vidmar 2014: 25). It is thus not pre-guaranteed 
that the residency status of these groups would continue to be protected by EU citizenship. However, 
following the Kurić doctrine, it appears that these categories of people retain their present residence 
rights as an effect of the ECHR and regardless of what happens with Scotland’s EU membership. The 
Kurić doctrine thus answers Ziegler’s point that the referendum would also have meaningful effects on 
the citizenship rights due to uncertainty surrounding Scotland’s EU membership. Regardless of 
whether Scottish citizenship would carry EU citizenship and whether Scottish citizens would also keep 
UK citizenship, Hamish will be able to continue to reside in Amsterdam and Slawomir in Glasgow. It 
is true, however, that the ECHR-effect would only freeze the existing rights. EU citizenship as such 
would not be retained via Kurić If Scotland remains outside of the EU and Hamish does not retain his 
UK citizenship, he will only be able to continue to reside in the Netherlands, but will no longer be 
entitled to exercise EU free movement rights in e.g. Germany.  
What does this analysis mean for Ziegler’s point on enfranchisement being at the same time too 
inclusive and too exclusive? First of all, Scotland is not entirely comparable to dissolutions of socialist 
federations where the concept of internal citizenship existed. Where it exists, internal citizenship is a 
point of reference which identifies the core of the people who decide. As shown above, this core can 
be expanded by permanent residents. International practice is somewhat contradictory and there are no 
settled rules of (customary) international law that would govern the procedural standards of 
independence referendums. In the absence of internal Scottish citizenship in the UK, other means of 
enfranchisement had to be employed. Certainly, it would be possible to argue that everyone born in 
Scotland should be entitled to vote, especially if this person is ultimately entitled to become a citizen. 
However, even this solution could be challenged with ‘hard cases’.  
Imagine a person whose parents are both English, she has always lived in England, yet she was 
coincidentally born in Edinburgh. Why should this person be entitled to vote more than a Polish 
national who actually lives in Scotland, whose children go to school there and who intends to remain 
indefinitely? In essence, when you need to identify a group, you inevitably need to draw certain 
boundaries which can always be challenged by borderline examples. In some instances, the group will 
be too inclusive and in others it will be too exclusive. What is important, in my view, is that there is no 
deliberate manipulation of enfranchisement, that the rules of the game are not written in such a way 
that enables one football team to play with eleven players while the other team plays with only ten 
players. Scotland’s enfranchisement is defensible. In the absence of the concept of internal citizenship, 
a variant of a territorial approach appears to be a fair choice. Giving the right to vote to those born in 
Scotland and in residence elsewhere could also lead to problems.  
Ziegler specifically points to the discrepancy between ‘the people’ for the purpose of voting at the 
referendum and ‘the people’ for the purpose citizenship. However, this is not unusual in international 
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practice. For example, many new states tend to extend eligibility for citizenship to the diaspora, 
immigrants and their descendants. As non-residents of the new state and often non-citizens of the 
predecessor state, these individuals are usually excluded from voting in the independence referendum. 
Yet, they qualify as citizens later. Once a state is created, it may wish to throw the ‘citizenship net’ 
broadly and catch non-residents with links to the new state, albeit these links can often be rather loose. 
Nascent states feel somewhat vulnerable when they first come out of their cocoons and try to keep ties 
with the diaspora for a number of reasons, political, economic and cultural. Awarding (dual) 
citizenship to such groups is a way of doing so.  
I would even go as far as to say that a complete overlap between future citizenry and the scope of 
the franchise at the independence referendum can be problematic. In principle, nothing is wrong if the 
citizenry ultimately includes people living abroad with loose ties to the (new) state. But including the 
diaspora too generously in the decision-making process on the future legal status of a territory can 
distort the results. At the end of the day, it should be, in principle, for the people who live in a certain 
territory to determine the destiny of that territory. Would it really be legitimate for the future of 
Scotland to be decided by a Scottish-born person, who feels very Scottish otherwise, but has lived in 
London or Sydney for 40 years? Should Scotland become independent, good reasons may exist to 
indeed give this person an option to claim Scottish citizenship. At the same time, good reasons exist 
why this person should not vote in the referendum. Certainly, Ziegler’s example of Hamish who has 
just moved to Amsterdam may tempt us to conclude otherwise and say this is different than being 
abroad for 40 years, but the line needs to be drawn somewhere. Arbitrariness can never be completely 
avoided, yet it seems reasonable to enfranchise on the basis of slightly modified voting eligibility rules 
in local elections. Enfranchisement in local elections is territorial, combined with a qualifying 
citizenship. An independence referendum is an eminently territorial question, so its rules of 
enfranchisement should also be, in principle, territorial. 
In the end, I do not think that ‘the people’ for the purposes of the independence referendum should 
entirely overlap with ‘the people’ for the purposes of the citizenship of the future state. The decision 
who are the people is ultimately arbitrary and, on the first sight, illogical: Hamish can be Scottish for 
some purposes but not for others, and Slawomir the other way around. In fact, good reasons exist for 
such inconsistencies. In my view, two concepts of the people of Scotland exist: one concept for the 
purposes of the referendum, another concept for the purposes of future Scottish citizenship. They 
should be seen as two separate categories.  
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Not all who Are enfranchised need participate 
Ben Saunders* 
Drawing democratic boundaries is always difficult, but this difficulty is particularly clear when the 
decision is one that potentially alters these boundaries, creating a new demos. Ruvi Ziegler’s proposal 
is that the franchise for the independence referendum ought to correspond to the proposed Scottish 
citizenship. If there are people who will be offered citizenship, then it seems that they have a stake in 
the issue and ought to have a say in the referendum. Conversely, if people are given a say in the 
referendum, then it seems that they have a good claim to citizenship as well. 
Though this seems prima facie attractive, I share the worries voiced by others, notably Rainer 
Bauböck. Further, Ziegler’s proposal seems to assume that citizenship and the right to vote should go 
hand in hand, yet there is no logical nor obvious moral reason why this should be the case (Lardy 
1997). The particular package of rights traditionally associated with citizenship is essentially a 
historical accident. We may wish to give the vote to some who will not be given citizenship, because 
we do not wish to accord them other rights that would be afforded by citizenship. 
Some hold that everyone affected by a decision should be enfranchised in it, though this has radical 
consequences. A less radical proposal, which Dimitrios Kyritsis seems to accept, is that only those 
who will be subject to coercion as a result of a decision need be enfranchised. Both the ‘all affected’ 
and ‘all coerced’ principles suggest a franchise wider than current citizens or residents (Song 2009). 
However, neither principle requires that we grant these people other rights that are usually attached to 
citizenship, such as the right to enter and remain within our community. 
I am inclined to think that residency is more important than citizenship in determining who should 
be enfranchised. Those who are long-term residents in Scotland should have a say over its future, since 
they will be part of that future, even if they are not (at least immediately) offered citizenship. If this is 
correct, then the Polish immigrants interviewed by Derek McGhee and Emilia Pietka-Nykaza need not 
feel that it is not their place to participate in the decision; provided that they are settled indefinitely in 
Scotland, and are not merely transient visitors, then they have a right to be included. 
What McGhee and Pietka-Nykaza’s survey does highlight, however, is that we may distinguish 
between those who should be given the right to participate and those who should actually participate. 
Clearly, it makes no sense to say that someone ought to vote if she is not afforded the opportunity to 
do so, but it is possible that someone afforded the opportunity to vote ought not to exercise it. 
Consider someone who moved to Scotland for a one-year work contract (or perhaps a Master’s 
degree) in October 2013. Suppose that she will definitely leave in October 2014 and has no intention 
of ever returning. This person, if an EU or a qualifying Commonwealth citizen, will be entitled to vote 
in the September 2014 referendum, yet it seems plausible to say that she has no business doing so, 
given that she does not expect to have anything to do with an independent Scotland (which, by the 
Scottish Government’s own timetable, will not emerge until 2016 even if the vote is for 
independence). 
I am not suggesting that she ought not to be given the vote. It would be difficult for government 
officials to determine who should and who should not be given the vote on grounds such as these. 
Rather, my suggestion is that, even if she is given the vote, perhaps she ought not to exercise it, on 
principled grounds. This is not an absolute or all things considered judgement; it might be that other 
reasons make it at least defensible for her to vote. But, absent other considerations, it may be that she 
ought not to participate in the vote, even though she has the right to do so (and perhaps even ought to 
have this right). Though low levels of democratic participation are frequently lamented, it has been 
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argued that we ought to abstain, on principled grounds, when we are indifferent to the alternatives on 
offer (Sheehy 2002).  
It might be objected that this argument unreasonably assumes that voters are motivated solely by 
consideration of their own interests. If voting is better understood as an attempt to identify what justice 
demands, then there may be no objection to including more people in the vote if they help us to 
succeed. However, it is not clear that Scottish secession is a case where justice demands one particular 
answer. Further, even if justice does dictate what should be done, it need not license others to interfere 
in a community’s decision-making, any more than I can interfere with your conduct whenever it is 
immoral. Sometimes interference may be justified, but sometimes people have a right to act wrongly. 
Robert Goodin has argued that we ought, ideally, to enfranchise every individual in every decision, 
in order to be sure of including those affected (Goodin 2007). Over-inclusiveness, he suggests, is less 
troublesome than under-inclusiveness, since if those who are unaffected vote randomly then they are 
likely to cancel out, leaving the matter to be decided by the votes of those who are affected. 
Unfortunately, unaffected voters cannot be trusted to vote randomly or to abstain; there is a danger 
that if we extend the franchise too widely then some will use the political power they are given to 
impose their preferences on others. Nonetheless, perhaps it is better to err on the side of generosity 
when allocating voting rights, since those with the right can always abstain, while those without it may 
be deprived of a legitimate voice. 
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Different boundaries - different meanings 
Vesco Paskalev* 
Ruvi Ziegler initiated this forum debate with two claims – that all prospective citizens of a putative 
state should be considered as stakeholders in its coming into being, and that there should be 
congruence between them and the persons enfranchised to vote in the independence referendum itself. 
While the stakeholding claim seems more or less acceptable to most subsequent contributors, the 
congruence claim was intensely contested by almost everyone. This is surprising, since the latter 
seems intuitively appealing, supported by international law Ziegler quoted, and also fits well into the 
mainstream normative theory. On the other hand, the argument of Rainer Bauböck and others that the 
consensus behind the current franchise should be respected is very powerful too. From the beginning 
of the debate I felt that both sides are right, each with regard to a different referendum, and this was 
made obvious by the dilemma of the Poles resident in Scotland discussed by McGhee and Pietka-
Nykaza. 
Bauböck emphasises the normative significance of the difference between "the putative demos of 
an independent Scotland" and "the existing demos of Scotland as part of the UK". He argues that, 
currently, only the latter can hold a referendum which is democratically legitimate. There is a 
difference indeed, but this means that the referendum question: “Should Scotland become an 
independent country?” can be interpreted in two different ways. “Shall the Scottish nation become 
independent?”; Or: “Shall Scotland decide upon its future status independently of the UK?” I suspect 
that the independence movement aims to ask the former question.
1
 The vote for independence of 
Scotland is a matter of self-determination of certain people, and not merely as an upgrade of the status 
of certain territory, in the way that a referendum in say, Yorkshire, would be. Further, Scottish 
independence is qualitatively different from devolution, which is a good reason not to enfranchise the 
same people for both decisions. However we define 'people' in general and 'the Scots' in particular, if 
the referendum is to determine whether such a subject should become independent, it is precisely for 
the putative members of this subject to decide. This question is ontological and the putative demos 
comes into being by the act of the vote itself. If this is the question, the franchise should be narrowly 
tailored to minimise the discrepancy between the people for the purpose of self-determination and the 
people for the purpose of subsequent politics. On the other hand, the upgrade of the status of a territory 
is mostly utilitarian question – whether it would be better for an existing unit to separate or not. In 
such a referendum it is the people living in Scotland rather than the Scottish people that should be 
enfranchised. The questions may be similar, but the make-up of the enfranchised population would be 
identical only if the 'Scottish people' are defined as the 'people living in Scotland'. If this were the 
present case, all current residents should become prospective Scottish citizens automatically and not 
merely given opportunity to naturalise. Thus, whichever of the two questions the SNP intended to ask 
at the referendum, it got it wrong.  
The odd position of the Poles resident in Scotland who have found themselves enfranchised reveals 
the flip side of the same coin: if a significant number of people who are not (and do not aspire to be) 
Scottish can vote, the answer which the referendum will yield on 18 September 2014 will be irrelevant 
for the ontological question. When too many putative Scots are excluded and too many putative non-
Scots are included, the referendum can no longer be a legitimate act of self-determination of a people. 
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 I would attribute the agreement of the SNP which initiated the referendum to this enfranchisement scheme to either 
failing to notice the difference, or – more likely - strategic calculation with regard to the outcome. Yet, according to Jo 
Shaw, many documents of the Scottish government support the interpretation that the question is one of territorial 
upgrade and its aim is not to break all of the 'unions' that hold the UK together, but only the political union and some 
aspects of the economic union. As the two questions were not explicitly distinguished, the different voters may be 
actually answering different questions.  
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However it will be still a legitimate answer to the territorial upgrade question. It turns out that the 
boundaries of the franchise determine the meaning of the result, and – given the necessarily cryptic 
wording on the question on the ballot – which of the questions is being asked. Who can vote 
effectively determines what exactly they are voting for. While presumably the Scots want to vote on 
the self-determination question, they are given the opportunity to answer on a territorial upgrade 
question.  
One may wonder if the distinction makes any practical difference at all. It certainly matters for the 
future determination of Scottishness, but as Bernard Ryan noted, for the most part this would be 
decided not by the referendum itself but by the prospective Scottish constitution and other 
foundational documents afterwards. Yet, at the very least, it may affect whether people would vote and 
how they would vote. For example some hard core nationalists may boycott and denounce a 
referendum if 'all those Poles' are included, while liberals may vote 'yes' if foreign residents are 
included and 'no' if they are not. The framing of the question is not only a theoretical concern, and as 
we saw, the Polish themselves are actually thinking hard over it.
2
 With regard to this, movements for 
self-determination are well advised to make explicit which of the two questions they would like to put 
to test, and enfranchise the respective persons accordingly. This is a matter of political choice too. 
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 While I am sympathetic to the distinction Saunders makes between those who are entitled to vote, and those who ought to 
do so, I think that the very fact that certain people are enfranchised while others are not is already meaningful and affects 
the others, even if the former actually abstain.  
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Types of membership, types of processes and types of politics 
Dora Kostakopoulou* 
Ruvi Ziegler makes an important as well as interesting point in his kick-off contribution. By reflecting 
on the actual membership of the ‘single issue demos’ which will decide the future of Scotland on the 
18th of September 2014, on the one hand, and the putative, and rather sketchy at this point, 
membership of an independent Scottish commonwealth, on the other, he notices the incongruence 
between the two. He has fully grasped the historical and political context, which Bernard Ryan also 
eloquently outlines, but he is convinced that the franchise in the Scottish independence referendum 
should not have reflected the criteria deployed for political participation in local government elections 
(Section 2 of the Representation on the People Act 1983). Instead, it should have followed other 
criteria since ‘independence referendums share the fundamental and long-term characteristics of 
national elections, and their significance is enhanced by their capacity, from both a national and 
international law perspective, to alter the legal landscape for individual citizens’ (kick-off 
contribution).  
Why congruence? 
Ruvi Ziegler furnishes two arguments in favour of congruence. The first is that the principle that ‘all 
affected interests should be considered’ is not complied with since individuals who will be deemed to 
be ‘ab initio’ citizens should Scotland become independent are excluded from casting their vote on the 
18th of September 2014. The second argument is that the under-inclusive character of the present 
arrangement undermines the legitimacy of the referendum – an argument that Dimitrios Kyritsis does 
not share. Ziegler notices the paradox that the ad-hoc referendum demos excludes persons who will be 
eligible for citizenship on day one of independence while the proposed citizenry of a future state will 
exclude those persons who are eligible to participate in the constitutive political act of establishing the 
new state. This leads him to argue that ‘the determination of the franchise for the Scottish 
independence referendum was ill-conceived’ (kick-off contribution).  
Ziegler’s reasoning is both plausible and insightful. It is plausible because we are confronted with a 
paradox. It is also insightful because, notwithstanding the special role of political contexts and 
historical processes, it is conceivable that political scientists and lawyers can develop clear and 
normatively justified criteria for franchise in independence referendums. Having said this, however, 
Ziegler’s argument also rests on two presumptions which may not be universally shared. I will call 
these i) the time-continuum; and ii) the desirability of monism presumptions. 
The time-continuum presumption projects a linear temporal line among the independence 
referendum, day one of independence and everyday political life post-independence. By so doing, it 
underscores the different political acts, processes, stages and politics that are involved in the transition 
of a political unit from regional self-determination to state formation to polity functioning and state 
maintenance. It thus subsumes multiplicity into an overarching monism; one type of political process, 
one type of politics, and one type of membership and electoral participation.  
Types of process, types of politics and types of policy 
Neither historical manifestations of a political unit’s secession nor imaginative constructions of state 
formations in contractarian political theory, such as, for example, the Hobbesian formation of a 
sovereign state, conflate the constitutive act of the formation of a state with law and policy making by, 
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and within, the (new) state. The former is a state-generative act or an act of constitutive politics since 
it emplaces a political structure. Following the establishment of a state, a different political process, 
which could be either inclusive or elitist in character, normally commences with a view to designing a 
complex array of policies and their generative structures. Foreign policy and external action, 
distributive policies, regulative policies and constituent policies will be enacted thereby shaping the 
state’s functioning and maintenance. Defining who will be a citizen, or will be worthy to become 
citizen, is a constituent policy. And it is normally politics (and ideology) which will determine the 
scope of policies, including the scope of constituent policies, such as the citizenship policy of the new 
state. In other words, there is no continuum between ‘the constitutive’ and ‘the constituent’ and there 
is a lot of writing, a lot of re-writing and a lot of creativity in institutional design and policy 
formulation and implementation post-independence.  
All this is to say that ‘framers’, that is, those who will vote in the independence referendum, do not 
have to be identical with ‘the deciders’ in an independent Scotland. Similarly, having chosen the 
residence-based option for franchise on the 18th of September 2014, there existed no obligation on the 
part of the Scottish Government to outline the scope and content of future policies in detail in a 
document. The legitimacy of the referendum would not have been undermined if Scotland’s Future: 
Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, which was published by the Scottish Government in 
November 2013, contained no explicit, or very ambiguous, references to the content of the citizenship 
law of the newly independent state. Nor do any putative claims for inclusion into the body of citizens 
by qualifying Commonwealth citizens and EU citizens resident in Scotland derive their normative 
force and political weight from the fact that these persons will take part in the independence 
referendum. Such claims would have to be premised on the normative force of democratic 
considerations which make residence and participation in the socio-economic life generative of the 
entitlement to participate fully in the political sphere and to authorise the laws which govern one’s 
affairs. Their right to vote in the referendum stems from the above premise and could thus be a 
supplementary ground in favour for their inclusion into the permanent Scottish demos following 
independence.  
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the different political processes and politics involved in 
polity transitions must be put in proportion and perspective. True, a discussion of who should be part 
of the people of Scotland is rather premature at this point for the reasons that both Rainer Bauböck and 
Bernard Ryan outline in their contributions, but if predictions or a critical examination of what has 
been suggested thus far can be made at an institutional level, then one has to recognise the possibility 
of more than one pattern or policy option as well as the possibility that what might be chosen in the 
eighteen-month period that will follow a ‘yes’ outcome on the 18th of September 2014 might contain 
significant variations from what was proposed in November 2013. This is how politics works and 
almost any generalisation concerning policy design often proves to be inapplicable to most of the 
cases of concrete policy formulation.  
This is not to say that academics and policy practitioners should not engage with questions 
concerning the (rightful) membership of the Scottish demos and provide advice about the content of 
the future Scottish citizenship law and policy. Rather, one needs to recognise that any such intellectual 
endeavour will be unavoidably normative in the same way that any really good citizenship theory is 
unavoidably normative. And while scholars are mainly interested in neat designs and are attracted to 
settled patterns and the elimination of framework ambiguities, real politics is messy, complex and 
unpredictable. The making of a real law is almost never a linear path from point A to B, but an act of 
producing a mosaic where multiple models and different patterns are brought together in a single 
design. And the Scottish citizenship law mosaic remains yet to be configured.  
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Different membership criteria for different demoi? 
The different political moments involved in the Scottish independence story, the different political 
processes and types of politics unavoidably yield different types of ‘we, the people’ for the purposes 
of state formation and state functioning or maintenance following formation. While congruence 
between the membership criteria of the referendum demos, on the one hand, and the Scottish demos is 
not necessary since the connection between the types of demoi is a loose one, it is still desirable and 
important to reflect on the existing criteria of membership, characterise policy choices as good or bad 
and, generally speaking, to consider important questions about political membership, inclusion and 
democracy. This is precisely what Ziegler has invited us to do. If we value consensual and inclusive 
political processes and open and democratic politics, the choice of policies (of a citizenship policy in 
this case) becomes more limited. I fully agree with Ziegler that in formulating policies, governing 
elites need to: a) be inclusive; b) be as consistent as possible; and c) give a political voice to all those 
who have made Scotland the hub of their lives and will be subject to Scotland’s jurisdiction on day 
one of independence – thereby according priority to democratic, as opposed to ethnocentric, 
considerations. Congruence between the different demoi would thus be normatively desirable; the 
Scottish citizenship law and policy should mirror the residence-based approach of the Scottish 
referendum franchise.  
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Puerto Rico: the referendum strategy and its discontents 
Jaime Lluch* 
Although I have some expertise on Canada (Quebec), the U.K. (Scotland), Spain (Catalonia), and Italy 
(South Tyrol and Valle d’Aosta), I want to discuss in this forum the case of Puerto Rico. 
On 6 November 2012, creative politicians in Puerto Rico arranged to hold a plebiscite on the 
territory’s future constitutional status. In the civil law tradition of Puerto Rico, the term used is 
“plebiscite,” not referendum. This was the fourth plebiscite of this sort following those held in 1967, 
1993, and 1998. Politicians in Puerto Rico are now engineering a fifth plebiscite to be held sometime 
in the next two years. These have all been constitutive referendums in the sense that they sought to 
invoke the constituent power of the people to (potentially) adopt a very different constitutional status. 
Contrary to the upcoming referendum in Scotland, or the two ones that were held in Quebec, these 
plebiscites were not strictly speaking “independence referendums.” As defined by Ruvi Ziegler, the 
latter are referendums that may result in the succession of states, i.e., the “replacement of one state by 
another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory.” Instead, we can call them self-
determination referendums, since the question posed to the voters has always presented all three major 
constitutional status options. Also, one of the constitutional options (and one which has been gathering 
electoral strength in the last few decades) involves asking the central state to accept Puerto Rico as one 
of the constituent units of the federation. From the point of view of the U.S. state, this involves state 
expansion, not state contraction, and thus the potential political effect is the opposite of a successful 
independence referendum.  
Finally, at no point has the choice for the voters been “independence yes or no” or “federation yes 
or no.” In that sense, the Puerto Rican plebiscites are more like the proposed Catalan referendum than 
the Scottish one. In Catalonia, the proposed text of the referendum is: “Do you want Catalonia to 
become a State?" and "In case of an affirmative response, do you want this State to be independent?" 
Although the first question is rather unclear and ambiguous, it would seem that the two questions 
taken together would offer voters the chance to vote for either the current Spanish State of 
Autonomies, federation, confederation, or independence. Jaume Lopez seems to recognize this in his 
contribution, although he casts a less critical eye on the ambiguity of the first question than I do. By 
contrast, the referendums in Puerto Rico have been straightforward and clear in the choice presented to 
the voters. However, there has always been considerable political jostling regarding who defines the 
constitutional status options, and how the different formulas (federalism, autonomy, or independence) 
are defined.  
The most vital issues in Puerto Rico regarding these referendums have involved culture and 
national identity (both in the USA and Puerto Rico), the nature of the federal political system of the 
USA, the rigidity of U.S. constitutionalism, the nature of the post-1952 political status and its 
limitations, and the procedural aspects of these referendums, in particular whether the U.S. Congress is 
willing to provide for a federally-sponsored, binding vote, with the constitutional formulas pre-
approved by Congress.  
After four plebiscites, nothing has fundamentally changed in Puerto Rico’s political status since 
1952. For several years now, there has been an emerging consensus among political and social elites in 
Puerto Rico that the criollo plebiscite route is probably exhausted. Elites from all the political 
persuasions are now converging on the idea that instead of a plebiscite, a Constitutional Assembly on 
Status should be convened. Such an assembly would serve as a deliberative body, representing the 
people of Puerto Rico. It would seek to elaborate clear formulas for the three major constitutional 
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options and would then demand from the U.S. Congress a clear commitment to the three formulas it is 
willing to support and eventually to follow through with a federally-sponsored solution.  
Surprisingly enough, the issue of the franchise for the vote in these referendums and the question of 
who would qualify for citizenship ab initio in the case of a victory of the independence option have 
not been prominent in the discussion either in the public sphere or in academic commentary on these 
issues. Nevertheless, the two issues that are discussed in this forum regarding who should have the 
right to vote (i.e., the legitimate franchise) in such referendums, and who should be the citizens of a 
newly independent state, are intrinsically interesting and relevant to Puerto Rico.  
Regarding the first question, I agree with Rainer Bauböck that, where self-determination has been 
agreed between a territory and the central government, the only legitimate franchise in constitutive 
referendums is the currently existing one for the territory in question. Indeed, in the plebiscites held in 
Puerto Rico, the enfranchised persons have been those residing on the island and who are registered on 
the rolls of the Electoral Commission of Puerto Rico, usually because they participate in 
local elections.  
In these plebiscites, there has been of course a rich discussion in the public sphere, and one of the 
questions posed has to do with who should have the right to participate in such momentous occasions. 
There are more than four million first and second-generation Puerto Rican immigrants in the USA, and 
it has been suggested that perhaps they should be included in the franchise. However, as a matter of 
law, this has never been accepted and the Puerto Rican demos has been defined as consisting of those 
U.S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico. Thus, Cuban immigrants, Dominican Republic immigrants, a 
sprinkling of European immigrants, and mainland U.S.-born immigrants, can vote and have voted in 
these plebiscites, as long as they are U.S. citizens registered in the electoral rolls of the Electoral 
Commission. The situation might be different if the demographics in Puerto Rico were similar to those 
in Hawaii: by the time Hawaii was accepted as a state in 1959, the native Hawaiians were a minority, 
and the majority were continental U.S.-born residents.  
No one has even tried to suggest that the other 317 million U.S. citizens living in the 50 states of 
the federation should be entitled to vote in these plebiscites. Yet in Spain this position has been 
seriously put forward by the Popular Party and its think tank FAES. They have argued that if they 
were to allow a referendum on the future of Catalonia, all 47 million Spanish citizens should be able to 
vote. In the case of Puerto Rico, at least three of the four political status options that Puerto Ricans 
have, require the consent of U.S. Congress: becoming a state of the USA federation, acquiring a free 
association status or some kind of enhanced autonomy would have to be approved by Congress. Even 
a negotiated form of independence would depend on the U.S. legislature’s good will and consent as a 
practical matter. Thus, no matter what Puerto Ricans decide in their criollo plebiscites, their collective 
will is subject to whatever substantive conditions and procedures the U.S. Congress decides to 
impose.  
This is not surprising, since Puerto Rico’s history is one of back-to-back colonialism. Spain created 
this state of affairs in 1493 and the U.S. took over at the close of the 19th century. Many would say 
that the status inaugurated in 1952 continues to be “colonial”. From a social science perspective, this is 
correct in my opinion. Thus, Puerto Rico has an inalienable right to self-determination.  
Moreover, as in Scotland, Catalonia, Euskadi, and Quebec, it would be a mistake to refer to these 
territories as mere regions, when in fact they have all the accoutrements of nationhood: a large 
proportion of the population in these nations exhibits national consciousness. As the president of the 
Puerto Rican Independence Party Rubén Berríos Martínez expressed it in a testimony before U.S. 
Congress: “The problem of Puerto Rico... is not a problem of disenfranchisement of a minority or an 
issue of civil rights, as some people believe. It is not a problem of individual rights. It is a problem of 
national rights, of the inalienable rights of a nation, of a people, to govern themselves.” 
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Regarding the second question, who should be the citizens of a newly independent state, this 
question has not been very relevant in recent years in Puerto Rico. Independentism was an important 
force during the first half of the 20th century but in the last few decades independentism has been at an 
all-time low point, barely reaching 5% of the electorate. Debate in the public sphere and academic 
commentary has tended to ignore this issue of who should be the citizens of a newly independent 
Puerto Rico. 
A related question is more relevant for contemporary Puerto Rico. If Puerto Ricans were to choose 
a form of genuine free association as their preferred constitutional status, would the residents of Puerto 
Rico be able to maintain their U.S. citizenship and transmit it to the next generations? Puerto Ricans 
hold U.S. citizenship by virtue of a 1917 federal statute: theirs is not the usual Fourteenth Amendment 
citizenship. The Report by the President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico of 2005 cast doubts on whether 
they could do so
1
, while a leading constitutional law scholar in Puerto Rico has argued that Puerto 
Ricans could retain their U.S. citizenship, could probably hold dual citizenship under a formula of free 
association and could continue transmitting their U.S. citizenship to their offspring (González and 
Julián 1990). 
Below, I give some further background on these plebiscites and the existing autonomy of Puerto 
Rico. 
Background: The territorial autonomy of Puerto Rico 
Since 1898, Puerto Rico has been an “unincorporated territory” of the United States, and the nature of 
its relationship with the U.S. has been set by federal statutes, especially the Foraker Act of 1900, the 
Jones Act of 1917, and the Federal Relations Act of 1950-1952. Although the U.S. Constitution 
provides for “states” and “territories,” the category of “unincorporated territory” was sculpted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Puerto Rico has a very peculiar form of territorial autonomy within the United 
Sates. It is part of the wider U.S. federal political system, but it is not one of the constituent units of 
the U.S. federation. Its autonomy is called “Estado Libre Asociado” (ELA), or free associated state, 
but it is neither free nor associated nor a state. There are now less than 4 million people on the Island 
and another 4 million plus Puerto Ricans on the U.S. mainland, many of whom circulate back and 
forth. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens by virtue of the 1917 federal statute, but they cannot vote in U.S. 
federal elections. 
Autonomies such as Puerto Rico are non-federal arrangements because they are constitutionally 
subordinate to the center.
2
 The “shared rule” component between the central state and the autonomous 
unit is weak or practically non-existent. The power to terminate or modify the Puerto Rico-USA 
relationship rests squarely within U.S. Congress. During 1952-53 the U.S. succeeded in getting Puerto 
Rico off the agenda of the UN Decolonization Committee in part by arguing that the Estado Libre 
Asociado was a compact of a bilateral nature whose terms may only be changed by common consent. 
However, soon thereafter Congress and the Executive branch started to behave “as if no compact of 
any kind existed and as if Puerto Rico continued to be a territory or possession of the United States, 
completely subject to its sovereign will. Puerto Rico leaders would spend the rest of the century 
unsuccessfully trying to convince the United States to allow full decolonization” (Trías Monge 1997). 
Supporters of the ELA have tried on several occasions to negotiate a “culminated ELA,” starting with 
the Fernós-Murray bill of 1959, but they have been unable to obtain the consent of U.S. Congress. 
However, Congress continues to assume that it can unilaterally exercise plenary powers over Puerto 
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Rico under the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the U.S. government contends that 
sovereignty over Puerto Rico resides solely in the U.S. and not in the people of Puerto Rico. 
For well over a century, politics in Puerto Rico has not been about political economy or the relation 
between the state and society. Instead, it has mainly been a debate about how the territory will relate to 
the U.S. federal political system and about how different conceptions of national identity shape this 
debate. These debates are dominated by three well-defined political orientations in the political party 
system: independentist, autonomist, and federalist (in the sense of becoming the 51st state of the 
USA). 
Previous plebiscites of 1967, 1993, and 1998 
In all the previous plebiscites, the choice offered to the electorate has been to decide between 
independence, autonomy or federalism. In 1967, autonomism won with 60% of the vote, while the 
independentists boycotted the event. In 1993, 48.6% voted for autonomism, 46.3% for federalism, and 
5.1% for independence. In 1998, 46.6% voted for federalism, 2.6% for independence, 0.3% for free 
association and 50.5% voted for “none of the above.”  
The plebiscite of 6 November 2012 
Several years ago the independentist party offered a proposal for holding a plebiscite with two rounds. 
In the first round, the people would be asked whether they wanted to continue living under the present 
(colonial) “unincorporated territory.” If the answer chosen by a simple majority was “No”, then there 
would be a second round (months later) in which the people would be asked to choose among the three 
non-status-quo options, following an educational campaign. The idea was to narrow down the options 
to the ones that would decolonize the polity, given that the U.S. Congress had never shown an interest 
in doing so, or even in holding a federally-sponsored plebiscite in Puerto Rico.  
In 2012, the federalist party in power in Puerto Rico at that time modified the idea of a two-step 
referendum and proposed instead a two question referendum, to be held on the same day as the regular 
elections for selecting both the new Governor and the new legislature (with a view to boosting their 
support in the regular elections). 
Thus, in the plebiscite of 6 November 2012, the people were asked two questions. The first was: 
“Do you agree that Puerto Rico should continue to have its present form of territorial status?” In the 
second question, they were asked to choose between federalism, independence, and a “sovereign 
ELA”, which is a light version of a genuine status of free association. The autonomist party actively 
and energetically campaigned for a Yes vote on the first question, and on the second question for a 
“blank vote.” The results showed that 54% of the people voted No on the first question – a No vote in 
this context suggesting a vote for change. For the first time in their history, Puerto Ricans voted to 
show their disapproval of their present political status. This was the most important result of this 
event. 
Among the choices offered by the second question, federalism received 61%, sovereign ELA 
33.3%, and independence 5.5%, but there were 480,918 blank votes, so if those votes were to be 
counted, federalism received only 46% of the vote. 
The U.S. Congress, as the legislative branch of the central state government, needs to take up its 
responsibility to end the current territorial status of Puerto Rico. In light of these results, another vote 
should be taken among these three options, but this time in a Congressionally-sponsored plebiscite. 
Every single one of the four plebiscites that have been held in Puerto Rico has been a locally-
sponsored one. The U.S. Congress has never agreed to provide for a binding referendum. This is not 
just a matter of respecting and implementing the result of the vote, but of exercising its responsibility 
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as the dominant power. Moreover, only the U.S. Congress can define what sort of conditions would be 
imposed if the people want to join the federation, what kind of transition period there would be were 
independence to be chosen, or what sort of expansive model of autonomy U.S. Congress would be 
willing to grant Puerto Ricans.  
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Who can vote on a referendum and who can be granted nationality of new states? 
Theory, practice and interests 
Vincent Laborderie* 
In this contribution, I will move away from the Scottish case and generalise about who is entitled to 
vote in the context of an independence referendum. I shall therefore discuss different theoretical 
possibilities and see how they were applied in previous referendums in Quebec and Montenegro). 
Unlike most contributors on this subject, I will not focus on what attitude is normatively preferable, 
but rather on the feasibility of different options and their impact on the referendum outcome. These 
two questions are, as we will see, closely linked. 
The last section of this contribution will deal with the issue of citizenship eligibility. In 
disagreement with Ruvi Ziegler’s kick-off contribution, I will argue that this question should not be 
linked with the referendum franchise. 
Theory about franchise in independence referendums 
In this contribution, I will use the phrase “host state” to identify the state in which a regional 
independence referendum took place or will be organised. This region will be referred to as a 
“secessionist region”.  
Concerning the franchise issue, the question at stake could be the following:  
Should the most pertinent criteria be residence in the secessionist region (including foreigners) or 
citizenship (including “nationals” living abroad)? 
Basically we can distinguish three groups of people concerned by the question at stake. The first 
one relates to citizens of the host state living in the secessionist region. This group must, without any 
question, be able to vote in an independence referendum. They represent the core of the electoral 
body. Participation of the two other groups is more questionable. The second group consists of people 
living in the secessionist region but who are not citizens of the host state. The third group is formed by 
citizens of the host state who are linked to the secessionist region but who live abroad or in another 
part of the host state. Including the second or third groups in the electoral body of an independence 
referendum depends on which criterion is taken into account: nationality or residence.  
Further criteria could specify which members of these two groups are allowed to participate in the 
referendum. For foreigners living in the secessionist region, a certain period of residence in the region 
could be required. The nationality of these foreigners could also be a criterion – as it is, for example, 
in the Scottish referendum where only EU and Commonwealth citizens could vote.  
Concerning nationals residing outside the secessionist region, time and space criteria could be 
applied. For having the right to participate, one must have left the secessionist region for less than a 
certain time. Current residence can also be a criterion. The most relevant distinction here is certainly 
between people who live in the host state but not in the secessionist region and people who live 
abroad.  
Franchise practice in Quebec, Montenegro and Scotland 
Far from being only theoretical, the scope of the franchise can determine the outcome of the 
referendum and, therefore, the future of host states, secessionist regions and of their inhabitants. I will 
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refer to the franchise criteria used in referendums that occur in a context comparable to Scotland and 
Catalonia (or any other part of the European Union), i.e. in economically developed and democratic 
countries. Historically speaking there are very few instances. The old cases of Norway (1905) and 
Iceland (1944) will not be of any help. The questions being debated in this forum were irrelevant at the 
time of these votes. But taking these cases into account helps us to realize that questions about the 
franchise are closely linked with the process of globalisation and of massive migration that can be 
observed all over the world and especially in Europe.  
Recent cases are limited to the two Quebec referendums (1980 and 1995) and the Montenegro 
referendum (2006).
1
 We can add the two referendums scheduled for 2014 in Scotland and Catalonia. 
But only the former will take place for sure and franchise questions have already been settled there.  
Concerning citizens of the secessionist region residing elsewhere, we observe that they get the right 
to participate in an independence referendum only in Quebec. But criteria are restrictive. As pointed 
out by Guy Laforest and Eric Montigny in their contribution, “they have to demonstrate that they left 
Québec temporarily” and for less than two years. The main reason for this situation is probably the 
difficulty to distinguish between “citizens” of the secessionist region and those of the rest of the host 
state. As Jure Vidmar points out in his contribution, internal citizenship was specific to socialist 
federations, such as Yugoslavia and the USSR. For nationals living abroad, the criterion would be 
their last residence in the host state. For nationals living elsewhere in the host state it is less obvious 
how to take into account this criterion. Should persons who were born in the secessionist region be 
considered? How about those who left their region for less than a certain period or those who have 
relatives there? 
Before the Montenegro independence referendum (2006), Serbia presented to the Venice 
Commission a list of 260.000 “Montenegrin citizens” living in Serbia. The majority of them would 
have probably voted against independence. Since only 460.000 voters were recorded in Montenegro, 
participation of these “Serbian-Montenegrins” could have had a decisive effect (Cattaruzza 2010: 32).  
We touch here upon an important issue: advantages for “yes” and “no” camps to include different 
groups of voters. Coupled with the difficulty to determine who among citizens of the host state should 
count as a citizen of the secessionist region, this is probably the reason why people outside 
secessionist regions are so rarely authorised to participate in the referendum.  
Whereas in most cases the majority of people living elsewhere in the host state would vote against 
independence of the secessionist region, the preferences of people living abroad are more uncertain. 
But here one faces the problem of material and practical organisation. Most secessionist regions do not 
have facilities abroad to organise the vote of expats and would be able to build such capacities only in 
a few countries. So they would be obliged to use facilities of the host state. Even if, as in the Scottish 
case, an agreement with the host state exists, there might not be enough confidence to let central state 
authorities organise the vote.  
Concerning non-citizen residents in a secessionist region, other contributions offer various 
arguments for and against offering the franchise to them. I will not enter this discussion but rather 
underline that, also in this case, independentist forces would be better served by a restrictive approach. 
This is illustrated by the second Quebec referendum in 1995. The franchise in the independence 
referendum was restricted to Canadian citizens. Indeed, the Quebec government, organising the 
referendum without any participation of federal authorities, assumed that foreigners would vote 
against independence. It seems that the Canadian government shared the same belief as it offered the 
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Canadian nationality to an unusually large number of foreigners residing in Quebec just before the 
referendum.
2
 This is partly reflected in the outcome. Only 33% of voters in Montréal, favoured 
independence in the 1995 referendum whereas the ‘yes’ option got a total of 49.5% for the entire 
Quebec province. Even if the Anglophone community represents a substantial proportion of the 
population of Montréal, it is obvious that the large number of immigrants living in the city played a 
decisive role in this outcome. In his famous and shocking speech after the referendum, Jacques 
Parizeau, leader of the “yes” camp, proclaimed that they had been defeated “essentially by money and 
the ethnic vote”. 
This very pragmatic empirical observation can be supported by research which points out that 
support for independence is closely linked to level of identification with the secessionist region.
3
 We 
can assume that newcomers and non-citizens identify less with a secessionist region than natives of 
that region.  
Decisions about the franchise are strongly influenced by the advantage each camp could gain. If 
there is no agreement with the host state, the government of the secessionist region will organise the 
referendum itself and will obviously choose a franchise that favours the vote for independence. If there 
is an agreement between authorities of the host state and of the secessionist region – as in the Scotland 
and Montenegro cases – the franchise criteria result from a negotiation in which both involved parties 
would logically try to favour their preferred outcome. 
As a conclusion concerning the franchise, we can stress two elements. The first is that there are 
many options how to determine the scope of the franchise. The second is that, in most cases, 
independentists have better chances if they narrow the right to participate in the referendum to official 
citizens of the host state living in the secessionist region. The less restrictive the criteria are, the more 
difficult to obtain a majority of votes in favour of independence. Far from being only a theoretical or 
normative question, the scope of the electoral body is of paramount importance in determining the 
outcome of a referendum. As the Quebec and Montenegro cases show, both parties are generally 
aware of it. In this respect, it will be very interesting to study the vote of non-UK citizens in the 
Scottish referendum on 18 September 2014. 
The citizenship issue 
I disagree with Ruvi Ziegler’s argument about the desirability of congruence between the criteria for 
the franchise in independence referendums and those determining who will obtain the nationality of 
the new state in case of independence. 
In fact, it seems natural that the group of people who would automatically obtain citizenship on day 
one of independence remains smaller than the group allowed to vote in the referendum. The difference 
between these two groups – those who could vote but not automatically obtain the new citizenship – 
would consist of foreigners living in the secessionist region. As many other contributors have already 
argued, it is appropriate that they can participate in the referendum if they have lived in the region for 
a certain period of time and/or want to remain here. But there is no reason that this participation is 
sufficient for their claim to citizenship status.  
                                                     
2
 Federal government always denied there was a planified policy to accelerate naturalization. But it was noticed that the 
number of new canadian citizens in Quebec was 87% higher in 1995 than in 1993 to reach 43.850. This figure drop by 
40% in 1996. During the month before referendum, 11.500 people were naturalized. Federal civil servant were requested 
to work on weekends to obtain these results. 
3
 Van der Zwet, Arno and Craig McAngus, ‘How Different are Assessments of Independence and Devolution Max? An 
Analysis of the Role of National Identity and Party Affiliation’, Scottish Affairs 23, no 1, 2014, pp. 1 26 ; Jérôme 
Couture and Vincent Laborderie, ‘Identité régionale et soutien à l’indépendance dans quatre États subnationaux (Québec, 
Écosse, Catalogne, Flandre)’, paper presented at 23rd World Congress of Political Science (IPSA, 2014).  
Vincent Laborderie 
48 
I would insist on the fact that a government of a secessionist region must be cautious about the 
citizenship issue. If a secessionist government promises to offer citizenship to everybody living in the 
region’s territory – or adopts very inclusive rules for acquiring it – and also gives the right to 
foreigners to vote for independence, there is a risk that this could be seen as buying votes. In other 
words, non-citizens would be encouraged to vote for independence, not because they want it but 
because of the promise of citizenship.  
In an EU context, giving nationality to a large number of non-EU citizens could also create a 
problem with other member states. Indeed, every citizen of a member state possesses rights in all other 
member states, such as the right to settle and to work there. As a consequence, if a new country is too 
permissive in granting citizenship, it could complicate relationship with other EU members. 
Ultimately, its recognition or new accession as EU member state could be threatened.  
For all these reasons, I suggest that the citizenship issue and the right to participate in a referendum 
on independence should be disconnected. Concerning the former issue, it seems essential to 
distinguish citizens of the host state who live in the secessionist region from other groups. This first 
group of people should be offered the new nationality on day one of independence.  
For non-nationals, a new naturalisation policy could be implemented later, after the new country 
becomes independent and the new national government holds the possibility to define new criteria for 
acquiring citizenship. These criteria can differ from those of the host state. They can be more or less 
restrictive. But it is important that they are legally disconnected from the independence referendum. 
Indeed, it is generally agreed that a decision taken by referendum must be as clearly stated as possible. 
An essential aspect of this clarity is that there is only one question at stake. Adding immigrant 
integration and citizenship issues to the question of independence in the same referendum certainly 
will not favour clarity. 
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In a secession referendum the franchise should depend on what you do, not what you are 
Daniel Weinstock* 
Imagine that the government of a federated entity with recognized borders launches a referendum to 
secede from the federation to which it belongs. The argument I want to make in this very short 
intervention is that citizenship in the federation, and residency in the potentially seceding entity, are 
individually necessary, and jointly sufficient conditions for participation in the referendum vote. This 
conclusion places me at odds with some of the contributors to this forum, including Ruvi Ziegler, 
whose excellent contribution kicked it off. 
Many proposals have been made to specify who the demos should be in order to determine the 
democratic franchise. At one extreme lies what some have called the all affected principle. That 
principle, as its name indicates, suggests that all those who are affected by a democratic decision 
should have some say in the decision-making process.  
This principle is clearly over-inclusive in the case of a secession referendum. After all, all citizens 
of the federation in question will be affected in substantial ways by the decision of a federated entity to 
secede. But it seems inappropriate to give them all a right to vote. After all, the desire to secede is 
most often born of the sense on the part of a substantial number of those living in the federated entity 
that all is not as it should be in their relations with their federal partners. To give those federal partners 
an effective veto would be simply to import the logic of the problems that have triggered the desire for 
secession into the decision-making process itself (Arrhenius 2005).  
At the other end of the spectrum lies the nationalist principle, according to which all those people 
who trace their origins back to the “founding people” of which the territory of the federated entity is 
seen as the national homeland should be allowed to make such an existential decision as whether to 
secede or not. 
This principle would on broadly liberal-democratic grounds be unacceptable, by ruling in people 
who oughtn’t to have a say, and by ruling out people who ought to have one. Let me explain. 
The defender of a nationalist principle would consider that someone who traces his origins back to 
the founding national group should have a say in whether secession should occur or not, even if he has 
not resided on the territory for years, indeed even if his parents or grandparents had not done so. It 
would, however, rule out people who reside on the territory, even though they have only arrived 
recently, and/or are not members of the founding national group. 
It seems to me that excluding “blood nationals”, even blood nationals who are still citizens of the 
larger federation, is a requirement of liberal democratic ethics. The basic idea is that the right criterion 
to use in order to determine who gets to vote in secession referendums is a commitment to contribute 
to the (economic, political, cultural) life of the putative new country, and that simply being related by 
blood to the founding national group constitutes no evidence of that. 
The case of blood nationals who are still citizens of the federation is a difficult one, and my 
exclusion of them might seem to put me in contradiction with an argument that I have put forward 
elsewhere, according to which dual nationals should be allowed to vote in elections of the country or 
countries of residence of which they are not residents at time of election.  
There is, however, a principled reason to include such people in national and sub-state election, and 
to exclude them from secession referendums. My argument for the former claim is, in a nutshell, that 
diversifying epistemic perspectives can help a polity get it right in choosing between political parties’ 
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policy proposals. Citizens who live outside the polity making a decision may be able to “see” aspects 
of policy questions that are overlooked or under-emphasized by people inside. 
But there is no “getting it right” in the case of a secession referendum. Assuming that the group 
that is considering secession is not doing so frivolously (and what that standard involves is a vexed 
question indeed!), it is an existential one, about the kind of polity that they want to be. That the group 
may or may not come to regret a decision does not mean that secession should be treated as a question 
to which there is a right answer. 
Citizens of the federation who are residents, where that term denotes a legal status, rather than a 
merely factual one, are in virtue of their satisfaction of the criteria for the granting of the status of 
resident those who best satisfy the criterion that I am putting forward as most appropriate for the 
granting of the right to vote in secession referendums. The granting of that status is the best index we 
possess to track the willingness and commitment to contribute to the society in the requisite ways. It 
is, like any institutional criterion, an imperfect one. But it is, I would argue, as close as we can get. 
Two categories of persons constitute interesting limit cases. They are, first, those who have been 
accepted as immigrants, and who have thus been received as candidates for citizenship , but who have 
not yet acquired that citizenship, either because they have not satisfied a temporal criterion, or because 
they have not yet undertaken steps to acquire it in cases in which they have satisfied that criterion. 
And second, there are those who possess international mobility rights within the potentially seceding 
territory, and who reside there in virtue of those rights, rather than in virtue of having been accepted as 
immigrants. The clearest example of this latter category would be citizens of the European Union 
when they find themselves in one of the EU states of which they are not citizens. I think that there is 
no “right” answer as to whether these two groups should be enfranchised in secession referendums or 
not. For what it’s worth, I would opt for enfranchising the first group before I would the second, 
because the process of applying for immigration is a more demanding sign of one’s commitment to 
one’s new home than is simply availing oneself of one’s mobility rights. But I don’t think that a grave 
injustice is committed if the reverse prioritization were to be made (as is the case in the Scottish 
referendum). 
At basis, my view is that for existential questions such as whether to form a new country or remain 
a part of an already existing one, participation in secession referendums should be determined by what 
you do, rather than by what you are. Legal residency tracks that moral idea tolerably well. 
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Catalonia: Will Catalans be permitted to hold a legally binding referendum on 
independence? 
Montserrat Guibernau* 
It feels a bit odd to write on who should be entitled to vote in a referendum on Catalan independence 
at a time when the Spanish State, invoking the Spanish Constitution, strictly forbids it. The key 
arguments invoked by the State are: Article 2 of the Constitution that reads: ‘the Constitution is based 
upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards’, and 
Article 8 which states that ‘the Army’s mission is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of 
Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional set up’. 
Currently, the Spanish Constitution strongly emphasizes the ‘unity’ of Spain, this is a point that 
unavoidably brings about references to the historical background of contemporary Spain including the 
heritage and memories of the civil war, the dictatorship, the transition to democracy and the coups 
d’état against the new democratic Spain, taking place as late as the 1980s. It also brings to the fore 
images of the continuous repression of Basques, Catalans and Galicians as national minorities that 
managed to obtain some political and cultural recognition in the new democratic Spain; that was a 
condition for the country to be regarded as a Western liberal democracy by the EU and other 
international organizations. 
Spain has traditionally displayed a ‘centralist view’ of the State in direct confrontation with the 
aspirations of its national minorities, in particular Catalonia, and attempts to foster a plural image of 
Spain have not been successful. For instance, former Prime Minister J.L. Rodriguez Zapatero sought 
to defend the idea of a ‘plural Spain’ thus emphasizing diversity within a progressive Spain. But 
probably Spain was not as progressive as he had envisaged, since he obtained limited backing for his 
views within his own party (the Spanish Socialist Workers Party or PSOE) and little support outside 
Catalonia – the community that overwhelmingly had supported his view. 
Will Catalans be permitted to hold a legally binding referendum on independence? 
In Spain, national minorities have a voice – access to Congress and the Senate – however, they have 
no veto power, and only acquire distinctive relevance whenever one of the main political parties is 
short of a majority and needs their votes to form a government.  
The 1979 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was approved in a legally binding referendum on 25th 
October 1979. The Preliminary Section of the Statute defines Catalonia as a nationality which ‘in 
order to accede to self-government, constitutes itself as a Self-Governing Community in accordance 
with the Constitution and with this Statute’ (Article 1.1) (it should be underlined that the sovereignty 
of Catalonia is implied in this declaration) and the Generalitat as ‘the institution around which the self-
government of Catalonia is politically organized’ (Article 1.2).1 
The powers of the Generalitat ‘emanate from the Constitution, this Statute and the people’ (Article 
1.3). These provisions make clear that the Constitution defines the scope and number of devolved 
powers and confirms the existence of a single sovereign demos in Spanish democracy, constituted by 
all Spanish citizens, including the Catalans. This interpretation considers the Catalan people to be a 
‘sub-group’ of the demos formed by all the citizens of Spain. For instance, it is precisely this 
interpretation that is invoked by those arguing that all Spanish citizens should be able to vote in an 
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eventual referendum on Catalan self-determination; a view that, if effected, would reinforce further the 
status of Catalans as a ‘constant minority’ within Spain.2 Although this may work from a normative 
point of view, it will not from a democratic perspective.  
The most important issue is how to unlock the current situation and introduce dialogue between the 
Spanish and the Catalan governments at a time when Catalan society continues to display a strong 
bottom up social movement in favour of the so called ‘right to decide’, this is, Catalans demand the 
right to hold a legally binding referendum on whether Catalonia should become independent or not. 
The date for this referendum, supported by a range of Catalan civil society associations, is 9th 
November 2014. At present, it looks unlikely that the Catalans would be permitted to hold a legally 
binding referendum on that date, however the strength and number of people participating in the 
forthcoming 11th September 2014 (Catalan Day) demonstration could play a key part in contributing 
to the unlocking of the current situation. Democracy is by nature a dynamic process, it is not fixed, 
and is the outcome of a constant dialogue: it is not possible to justify a continuous lack of engagement 
in dialogue while upholding democratic credentials. 
Who should vote and who should be offered citizenship? 
Rainer Bauböck highlights a fundamental difference between ‘independent states’ and ‘autonomous 
regions within states’ as polities of different kinds. In my view, this is very important because 
‘independent states’ are able to decide on who should and who should not be allowed/entitled to vote 
in an eventual binding referendum on self-determination affecting a part of that state. In contrast, 
‘autonomous regions within states’ usually lack the power to call for a referendum on self-
determination unless this is endorsed by the state. This tension is illustrated by the current imbalance 
of power between Catalonia and Spain and reflects the continuous relevance of the nation-state as key 
political actor. 
According to Article 7 of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, all Catalans as well as all Spanish 
citizens who are legally resident in any of the municipalities of Catalonia are Catalans and in my view, 
they should be offered ‘Catalan citizenship’ on day one of an independent Catalonia. Participation in a 
binding referendum on Catalan independence should be limited to Catalan citizens. A new 
naturalisation policy for long-term residents should make citizenship available after 5 years 
of residence. Further details should be the outcome of dialogue and debate among political forces in 
the Catalan Parliament, after the referendum takes place. If possible, steps should be taken towards a 
common EU policy on these matters so that similar policies could be implemented at the EU level.  
Who is a Catalan? A former president of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol, defined as ‘Catalan’ a person ‘who 
lives and works in Catalonia and wishes to be a Catalan’3, a definition that encompasses lieu of 
residence, workplace, and the ‘will’ to become a member of the Catalan nation as a modern, strongly 
pro-European prosperous polity. This definition points at some expectations regarding Catalonia as a 
particular type of nation –diverse, open and inclusive, where civil society has traditionally played a 
key role. It also highlights the ‘will’ of the individual to belong to that nation and often engage in the 
construction of a shared collective identity
4
.  
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Why Flanders is unlikely to have a referendum on independence anytime soon 
Dirk Jacobs* 
Belgium does not have particularly fond memories of organising a referendum on its political future. 
In March 1950, a referendum was held about the potential return of exiled King Leopold III, who had 
surrendered to German forces during World War II against the will of the government. In this 
referendum on the so-called ‘King’s question’, Flanders and rural parts of Wallonia in majority 
accepted the return, while a majority of the population in the industrial areas of Wallonia rejected it. 
When the King returned to the country in July 1950, a general strike broke out (mainly in Wallonia), 
bombs exploded and protestors were shot by the police, bringing the country to the brink of civil war. 
The government forced the King to abdicate in favour of his son, in order to avoid a potentially violent 
march on Brussels and to counter a serious attempt to form a separatist Walloon government. These 
events are part and parcel of the collective memory of the Belgian political elites and have for decades 
made the idea of organising a national referendum a no-go zone.  
Sixty-five years later, the memories of the ‘King’s question’ have faded, the Flemish nationalist 
movement is thriving, and Walloon separatism has almost disappeared. The Flemish nationalists 
explicitly support the Scottish and Catalan causes for independence and applaud the referendums, but 
do not call for a referendum on independence of Flanders.
1
 For outsiders, this might seems strange, as 
politically Flemish nationalists have never been in a stronger position. In June 2014, the N-VA, the 
“new Flemish alliance”, a right-wing nationalist party striving for Flemish independence, had a 
landslide victory in the national elections. In the elections for the Flemish parliament, the nationalists 
obtained 32% of the vote, and the N-VA is now leading the Flemish government, in coalition with 
Christian-democrats and right-liberals. In the federal parliament, the N-VA obtained 33 of the 150 
seats, making it the largest party in the hemicycle. N-VA is currently negotiating the formation of a 
federal government with the Flemish Christian-democrats, the Flemish right-liberals, and the 
Francophone right-liberals. Even if the N-VA has at several occasions expressed their support to the 
Scottish and Catalan initiatives for a referendum on independence, they are not employing a similar 
strategy in Belgium. Organising a referendum on the future of Belgium and the independence of 
Flanders is not on the negotiating table.  
There are several plausible reasons for this reluctant attitude of the Flemish nationalists towards the 
idea of a referendum. The most important reason is perhaps that all opinion polls consistently show 
that a majority of Flemish voters are not in favour of independence (Abts et al. 2014). Even among the 
electorate of the N-VA, there is insufficient support for independence. Indeed, even though the first 
article of the party statutes of the N-VA clearly states that the goal of the party is Flemish 
independence
2
, the party leadership has downplayed the urgency of independence, partly in an attempt 
to attract right-wing voters not holding nationalist views. In the last election campaign and during 
current government formation, the nationalists have made it crystal clear their priority is establishing a 
fiscally conservative government and keeping left-wing parties out of government. This does not mean 
they have given up on their nationalist agenda, but it is no longer centre-stage. N-VA keeps repeating 
the mantra that the Belgian federal state is an artificial construction bound to fail, but at the same time 
are stating that they prefer a gradual ‘evolution’ rather than a ‘revolution’. They believe that Belgium 
is to gradually evaporate in a process of devolution of powers to sub-federal entities and further 
transfer of competencies to the European level. They wish to replace the current complex system of 
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Regions and Communities by so-called ‘confederalism’ instead of immediately pushing for 
independence.
3
 Independence will come, but slowly.  
A major obstacle for any quick separation is that there is no clear-cut scenario for the federal 
capital of Brussels. The Brussels Capital Region is an officially bilingual territory, where both the 
Flemish and the Francophone community governments have prerogatives. It is geographically an 
enclave surrounded by municipalities that are part of the territory of the Flemish Region, and where 
Dutch is the official language (even if the majority of inhabitants of the Flemish municipalities 
surrounding Brussels are French speakers). Flemish independence would in theory remain relatively 
easy if it were to be limited to the territory of the Flemish region, but then the Flemish would have to 
give up their shared capital. Given that Brussels is historically a Flemish city, and that the Flemish 
minority of Brussels is heavily protected as a result of decades of political struggle along linguistic 
lines, for parts of the Flemish movement it would be considered treason to give up the capital city. 
Now that the ‘soft power’ of the Flemish and the status of the Dutch language has considerably 
increased in the capital compared to some decades ago, entirely giving up on Brussels would be a 
severe blow to the ‘Flemish cause’. Integrating Brussels in an independent Flanders is, however, 
unimaginable for Francophone political elites and for large parts of the Brussels population. Brussels, 
in other words, is the glue that keeps Belgium together and a clear ‘solution’ for Brussels, which 
would be acceptable for all, is not within reach in case Belgium would disappear as a country (Jacobs 
2007).  
Organising a referendum and launching debates on the phrasing of questions would be opening up 
a Pandora’s box. None of the major linguistic groups can afford to give up on Brussels, but Flemish 
independence is probably only realistic if they would give up the capital. This ‘sacrifice’ would, 
however, not remove all obstacles. Even if the referendum were limited to independence of the current 
Flemish regional territory, large regional discrepancies in voting patterns might arise, in particular in 
municipalities in the Brussels periphery where sizeable groups of francophones live in Flemish 
territory. The fact that the linguistic border fixed in 1963 no longer corresponds to sociological reality 
has been an ongoing source of conflict. Organising a referendum on Flemish independence would fuel 
demands in the Brussels periphery to be disconnected from Flanders and linked to Brussels. It would 
put at center stage again the demands of Francophones living in Flanders to be recognised as a 
‘national minority’ and be granted all rights foreseen in the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities which Belgium has signed but never ratified. Until now, the official discourse 
is that Belgium only has ‘national majorities’ which all have their own “turf” and that the current 
language legislation hence makes it obsolete to think in terms of national minorities.
4
 The Flemish can 
defend this reasoning in the Belgian framework, but will no longer be able to do so in a credible way 
in an independent Flemish state.  
In sum, a referendum on Flemish independence would just make things more complicated for 
Flemish nationalists. Tough choices would have to be made about secession scenarios and deals would 
have to be struck with Francophone compatriots, leading to the necessity to give up on Brussels and 
taking risks of losing parts of current Flemish territory in the bid for independence. Most importantly, 
as polling shows, finding a majority in Flanders for independence seems to be close to impossible. 
That is why federal Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo, a francophone socialist, in December 2012 
challenged the Flemish nationalists to call for a referendum on Flemish independence. That is why 
Flemish nationalists stress they do not want a revolution and see no need for a referendum: it is a 
battle they cannot win. 
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Voting in the referendum on Scottish independence: 
some observations from the front line 
Jo Shaw* 
Ruvi Ziegler's elegantly worded argument for the congruence of the referendum franchise and of the 
initial determination of the citizenry in a new independent Scotland, aka iScotland, along with his 
thorough rejoinder to the responses of a variety of commentators coming from different territorial and 
disciplinary backgrounds, may not offer the final word on this important question, but they certainly 
go a long way towards airing most of the key points that need to be made. Moreover, I have had the 
privilege of reading Ziegler’s rejoinder before writing this short text, and this has confirmed my view 
that my own contribution to the debate should take another angle. For I should confess that I have 
thought a lot more about this issue since Ziegler initiated this debate, having originally broadly 
subscribed to the 'hey ho, it's just a messy model like the rest of citizenship issues in the UK' school of 
thought, when it came to the question of how the Scottish referendum franchise was conceived in the 
Edinburgh Agreement and instantiated in legislation adopted by the Holyrood Parliament in the 
summer of 2013. But Ziegler has not only provoked some further thinking on the franchise, but also 
broader reflections on the matter of the Scottish referendum vote (and the campaign leading to the 
vote). 
Of course, the conception of the franchise adopted for the referendum on Scottish independence, 
largely based on the regional franchise and including, as a peculiar emanation of UK constitutional 
law not only qualifying Commonwealth and Irish citizens but also EU citizens, but excluding non-
residents whatever their citizenship, has been contested. The strongest contestation has come from 
persons born in Scotland but now living elsewhere in the UK, rather than those - such as Ziegler's 
example of the Scottish born graduate working in Amsterdam as an EU citizen - who live outside the 
UK altogether. This is hardly surprising, since they represent numerically by far the largest group who 
could lay claim to be disenfranchised. Many of them will have noticed that at the same time they have 
been 'offered' future citizenship in the various Scottish government documents that have come out 
which sketch the outlines of the initial determination of the citizenry. Indeed, it would seem that they 
become automatically Scottish citizens, although one would assume that those who are resident in 
rUK will retain UK citizenship, even if rUK were to decide to redefine its citizenry to exclude some 
groups of new Scottish citizens resident in Scotland (e.g. those born in Scotland who have never 
resided elsewhere in the UK). 
It is worth noting that the settlement of the franchise was - as Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (a 
distinguished Scottish former diplomat, occasional commentator on EU affairs, and member of the 
disenfranchised UK-based Scottish-born (and educated) diaspora) put it - a 'casual concession' by 
David Cameron to Alex Salmond, and it was a concession with considerable repercussions. The 
casualness of that concession, which received no public debate, is regarded by many resident in 
Scotland as typical of the casualness with which 'Westminster' deals with most Scottish matters, and 
thus has provided further fuel for the independence movement. 
The disenfranchisement of the group of 'non-resident Scots' - against the promise that they would 
be ab initio citizens of iScotland - was, however, probably the only workable outcome, since drawing 
up a register of electors based on either birth in Scotland or previous residence there (for how long?) 
would have been an extraordinarily expensive and possibly rather inaccurate exercise. If you accept 
the power of its premise of congruence, what Ziegler's argument does achieve, however, is that it 
shines a light on the perhaps over-inclusive ab initio citizenship condition of birth in the territory as a 
UK citizen (with no additional connections to the territory being necessary). But as Dora 
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Kostakopoulou has pointed out, the contestation of that is to come later, and will not occur unless 
there is a Yes vote on 18 September 2014. My experience with trying to generate interest in my earlier 
research has shown that, while people are a bit puzzled about who would be Scottish citizens in the 
event of independence, it has definitely not been an animating factor in the debate. It seems likely that 
the relatively over-inclusive scope of the ab initio definition, not to mention the proposal for a vaguely 
specified group of 'citizens by connection', who can apply to be naturalised even if they are not 
resident, tells us something about the main audience for documents such as Scottish government 
consultation papers on these matters, and that there would be a quietly supportive external diaspora 
who may prove to be rather influential in an iScotland. 
This leads me to the main comment I would like to make in this short contribution, and that 
concerns my observations from the front line. I wrote this note on the last day (2 September 2014) 
when qualifying referendum electors could apply to join the electoral register. We do not yet know the 
final tallies, but anecdotal evidence suggests that a lot more people will be registered to vote in 
Scotland for the referendum than were for the latest elections using approximately the same franchise, 
namely the Scottish Parliament elections of 2011. Of course, part of that surplus will stem from the 
additional 16 and 17 year olds who have been enfranchised in the referendum, but it is also clear that a 
large number of people who have allowed their voter registration to lapse (or who have never been 
registered) have now sought to make sure they will be able to vote. Some of the new registrations will 
also include EU citizens who were the subject of the research reported by Derek McGhee and Emilia 
Pietka-Nykaza, some of whom undoubtedly feel burdened by this 'privilege' of participating in the 
referendum, although others have been animated by this opportunity to contribute to a potentially life 
changing decision. One must presume that this surge of late registrations is also likely to signal a very 
high turnout, perhaps even between 80-85%. Speaking personally, I should state that I have never in 
my lifetime experienced anything akin to the political engagement which has been engendered by the 
opportunity that the independence referendum has given people in Scotland to discuss their future. 
Confirmed postal voters (an increasingly large percentage of middle class middle aged people who are 
likely to vote but are often not available on polling day) report on social media having rescinded their 
postal votes for this one time, just so they can experience the thrill of going to the voting booth.  
Much of the public politics of the referendum debate has been rather uninspiring, especially the two 
set piece televised debates between male, macho leaders (First Minister Alex Salmond and Alastair 
Darling, representing the 'Better Together' campaign). But I concur with others who say that this 
hardly represents the true tenor of the debate, which has been largely carried on outside the normal 
realms of political debate in the modern world, in families, workplaces, streets, town meetings, and 
festivals. And of course on social media where debate has been, in turns, both ‘shouty’ and quite 
inspiring. The engagement with the Yes campaign of a large number of independent grassroots groups 
often aligned with the political left has been responsible for much of this change from the normal 
fodder of political party dominated local, regional, national, and European parliamentary elections. 
Much of the 'new politics' has been animated by people involved in the cultural sectors, and has been 
tinged with a high degree of whimsy and humour. Perhaps the best example is offered by the series of 
conversations animated by the Scottish playwright David Greig, all through the Edinburgh Festival 
Fringe in August 2014, being an ironic tribute to David Bowie's intervention in the debate to suggest 
that Scots should vote no in the referendum: All Back to Bowie's. As the website states: 
“In response to David Bowie's famous declaration at the Brit Awards, a group of Scottish artists 
are setting up camp in Bowie's (metaphorical) living room for an irreverent lunchtime show 
exploring the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, and what it might mean for the country to 
stay with - or leave - the UK.” 
If this is the 'regional electorate' which Rainer Bauböck in his contribution argues is best placed to 
consider whether or not to upgrade a regional citizenship into the citizenship of an independent state, 
then anecdotally I would concur that confining the electorate by reference to residence has been 
successful. It has given a powerful sense of common destiny to Scottish residents, even if, of course, 
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we are making a decision which affects many more people than that group alone, for all the reasons 
that the contributors to this debate have made clear. To what extent that sense of destiny would carry 
over into iScotland, or back into a continuation of the 307-year Union of the Parliaments which must, 
surely, even in the event of a no vote, be ripe for radical constitutional reform, remains to be seen. 
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Ruvi Ziegler* 
I am most grateful to all the contributors for taking the time to engage with the topic and offer eye-
opening and thought-provoking perspectives on contexts ranging from Catalonia/Spain, 
Flanders/Belgium, and Scotland/UK to Quebec/Canada and Puerto-Rico/USA. The nature of this 
rejoinder makes it challenging to address the many incisive points raised in the contributions. My aim 
is to address principal points of contention – and agreement – that emerged from the debate, and to 
clarify several issues pertaining to putative citizenship claims from an international law perspective. 
In my kick-off contribution, I argued that it is normatively desirable for the enfranchised 
population in independence referendums to resemble the citizenry on ‘day one’ of a successor state 
that may come into being following an affirmative vote. I also submitted that, citizens ab initio of a 
successor state are significant stakeholders in an independence referendum that may bring that state 
into being. The distinction between the initial determination of the citizenry and the rules of 
acquisition (naturalisation) and loss of citizenship after independence should be emphasised: my 
claims concerned only the former. Notably, the above claims are not derived from an expressed 
preference for one of the models for attribution of successor state citizenship ab initio (see e.g. Jo 
Shaw’s research), as long as the selected model is compliant with international law standards as per 
the ILC Draft Articles.  
Independence referendums: background conditions  
My contribution steered clear of determining the legitimacy of particular external self-determination 
claims (see this encyclopaedic entry for select sources on self-determination in international law). 
However, as became evident during the debate, three background conditions need to be satisfied 
before such claims are brought forward by way of an independence referendum, and an additional 
condition may be critical for its implementation. 
First, a sufficiently determined political movement possessing the will to pose the independence 
question. Dirk Jacobs’ contribution demonstrated the implications of the absence of such a political 
will in Flanders. Jaime Lluch explained that previous ‘plebiscites’ in Puerto Rico were not strictly 
speaking ‘independence referendums’ as three of the four political status options involved remaining 
within the U.S. constitutional framework. Second, a defined territory. The considered case-studies 
(Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, Puerto Rico, and Flanders) indicate that an interim stage of self-
governance (be it devolution, federalism, and/or regional autonomy) is likely to precede an 
independence referendum. This legal and political reality may affect the question of eligibility, both 
for participation in the referendum and for citizenship ab initio. Third, and perhaps most critically for 
this debate, an identified ‘people’ on behalf of whom the claim for external self-determination is 
made. Finally, even though the acquiescence of the state from which secession is sought is not 
necessarily normatively required (Rainer Bauböck’s observation), its absence is a recipe for 
uncertainty. Note Jaume Lopez’s and Montserrat Guibernau’s portrayals of current tensions between 
the Spanish State and the Catalan Government, leading the Catalan Parliament to refer to the 9 
November 2014 vote as a 'political consultation' and asking a modular two-stage question rather than a 
straightforward independence question.  
I readily concede that my claims are normative; even if, as Guy Laforest and Eric Montigny 
observed, ‘on matters of referendums, consistent normative logic does not always work’, I believe that 
we should not give up on trying. I also acknowledge Dora Kostakopoulou’s insightful remarks 
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regarding the dynamism of political processes: it may very well be that the White Paper’s framework 
for citizenship ab initio will be altered following an affirmative vote and that, politically, the 
referendum would have probably gone ahead even if the SNP had refrained from setting out a 
citizenship agenda. However, despite my critique of the incongruence between the blueprint for 
citizenship ab initio and the referendum franchise, I think we ought to appreciate the fact that a plan 
has been presented; at least in this aspect, a standard has been set for future independence 
referendums. 
The franchise in independence referendums and putative citizenship: four categories 
In the main, the contributions addressed questions arising in the context of potential separation of a 
territory from an existing state rather than dissolution thereof. Hence, from an international law 
perspective, citizenship of the predecessor state remains unaffected. In contrast, dissolution of a 
predecessor state affects all its citizens. Against this background, the eligibility of persons belonging 
to the following categories of persons to vote in an independence referendum was considered: First, 
citizens of the predecessor state habitually resident in the putative successor state (including persons 
temporarily absent). Second, non-citizens habitually resident in the putative successor state. Third, 
citizens of the predecessor state formerly resident in the putative successor state or having other 
‘appropriate legal connection’ with the successor state. Fourth, other citizens of the predecessor state.  
A consensus has emerged that persons in the first category form the ‘core’ electorate in an 
independence referendum. Indeed, such persons will be considered citizens ab initio of a successor 
state (unless they choose to decline the offer): according to Article 24(a) of the ILC Draft Articles, 
concerning separation of a territory, a successor state shall attribute its nationality to persons 
concerned [defined as citizens of the predecessor state] habitually resident in its territory, subject to 
granting them the right of option (Article 26 thereof). As Jacobs noted, the reluctance of Flemish 
leaders to pose the independence question stems in part from the (electoral) implications of 
enfranchising Francophones currently residing in Brussels. 
A similar consensus has emerged that, although persons in the fourth category will be affected in 
substantial ways by secession, it would be inappropriate to enfranchise them in an independence 
referendum, as this would effectively grant the majority of the predecessor state veto power over 
secession (a point which Guibernau highlighted in relation to Catalonia). I contend that it would 
arguably be (at least equally) implausible to consider such persons as citizens ab initio of a successor 
state. 
Contributors diverged as to whether persons belonging to the second and third categories should be 
enfranchised and/or be considered/offered citizenship ab initio, offering normative, pragmatic, 
strategic, and (national) law arguments to support their position.  
Debate themes 
The following (non-exhaustive) themes have emerged from the debate: (1) external self-determination; 
(2) the ‘core electorate’ option; (3) the challenge of the regional franchise (4); Scotland: a tale of two 
unfitting franchises; (5) over-inclusiveness and abstention; (6) stake-holding and putative citizenship; 
(7) strategic ex/inclusion; (8) the significance of an agreement with the central government. I shall 
address them below. 
Whose external self-determination is it, anyway? 
International documents refer to the (external) self-determination of peoples. Article 1(2) of the UN 
Charter considers the development of ‘friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
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principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’, and the identically worded Article 1 of the 
ICCPR and ICESCR refers to peoples’ right to self-determination, by virtue of which ‘they freely 
determine their political status…’ In line with Vesco Pakalev’s contribution, I contend that a ‘people’ 
(or a ‘definable group’, to borrow the term used by the Canadian Supreme Court judgment, in Re 
Secession of Quebec, [138]) making a self-determination claim needs to be self-defined, so that it can 
plausibly answer this question: in the name of whom is external self-determination sought? The 
answer to this question should determine the category of persons entitled to participate in the 
referendum, since ‘the application of the right to self-determination requires a free and genuine 
expression of the will of the people concerned’ (International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion 
concerning Western Sahara, 16 October 1975, [55]).  
Hence, when external self-determination is sought via an independence referendum, inclusion and 
exclusion therein are not just symbolically significant: a flawed designation of the electorate may cast 
a normative shadow on the legitimacy of the referendum which, in turn, may affect the extent to which 
the outcome is recognised. Notwithstanding Jennings’ paradox of self-determination with which Jure 
Vidmar opened his contribution, self-definition is an inevitable part of an external self-determination 
process.  
I further assert that, consistently with international law, a putative state should have an initial body-
polity at the moment of coming into being. By setting a blueprint for citizenship ab initio, the Scottish 
government attempted to define the people of Scotland on behalf of whom external self-determination 
is sought. It could have made other choices reflecting different encapsulations of ‘the people’; 
however, unlike Kostakopoulou, I believe that, acting in good faith, the Scottish government had to 
make a choice and duly present it for public scrutiny. Lopez’s contribution noted that the Catalan 
government has not yet presented a similar blueprint; nevertheless, absent contrary indications, it may 
perhaps be presumed that the definition of a ‘Catalan’ in Article 7 of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy of 
Catalonia (which, in its preamble, refers to self-government of ‘the Catalan people’) reflects the 
category of persons whose external self-determination the independence movement seeks: Spanish 
citizens legally resident in Catalonia (subsection 1) and Spanish citizens resident abroad whose last 
legal place of residence was Catalonia (subsection 2). 
Herein lies the rub of my congruence claim: that, normatively, the designation of a ‘people’ whose 
external self-determination is sought should be reflected both in the franchise of a referendum on 
independence and in the initial citizen-body of a putative state. 
The ‘core electorate’ option 
Daniel Weinstock posited that (in a federation) citizenship of the predecessor state and habitual 
residence in the putative successor are individually necessary, and jointly sufficient for 
enfranchisement in an independence referendum; namely, that the franchise should not extend to 
persons in the second or third categories outlined above. Following my earlier discussion, Weinstock’s 
argument suggests that ‘the people of X’ for the purpose of external self-determination is coterminous 
with its citizen-residents, and that the franchise should be based on both criteria. I submit that the same 
logic, if adopted, suggests that this should be the initial body-polity on day one of a successor state. 
Weinstock observed that this proposition puts him at odds with mine. Now, this may be the case 
insofar as he views the exclusion of ‘“blood nationals’, even blood nationals who are still citizens of 
the larger federation’ to be ‘a requirement of liberal democratic ethics”, whereas my position is 
contingent on whether non-residents will be considered citizens ab initio. Hence, Weinstock opposes 
enfranchisement of non-residents in an independence referendum; in contrast, I believe that it depends 
on whether they are considered part of ‘the people of X’ for the purposes of external self-
determination, and that there may be sound reasons to include non-residents who have ‘an appropriate 
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legal connection’ with the seceding territory. Indeed this is why the ILC Draft Articles encourage 
successor states to give such persons the option to opt for their citizenship ab initio.  
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, at least on my reading, Weinstock’s proposition is compatible 
with my congruence claim. Moreover, notwithstanding the above, his proposition is compatible with 
the minimum requirements of the ILC Draft Articles. Article 8(1) states that ‘a successor state does 
not have the obligation to attribute its nationality to persons concerned [read: citizens of the 
predecessor state] who have their habitual residence in another state and also have the nationality of 
that or any other state’.  
The challenge of the regional franchise  
Bauböck (with whom several other contributors concurred) argued that, when a region which enjoys a 
degree of self-governance is considering external self-determination, the independence referendum 
franchise should be based on the regional franchise, which is (according to Lluch) the only legitimate 
franchise in a constitutive referendum. Notably, while the scope of Bauböck’s contention is limited to 
non-remedial secession, classification of some cases may be challenging (note Lopez’s different 
characterisation of Catalonia).  
Bauböck’s claim is two-fold: first, the existing regional franchise enjoys constitutional legitimacy. 
Second, ‘the [independence] vote belongs to the regional citizens who should decide on whether they 
want to change their region’s status through secession’. The first argument is important for obtaining 
the acquiescence of the central government; however, as independence operates outside the state’s 
existing constitutional order, it carries limited weight.  
The second leg of the argument is compelling, yet it too has limited force: the regional franchise 
ought to be the prima facie basis for determining the referendum franchise insofar as it defines ‘the 
people’ in the name of whom external self-determination is sought. This will often be the case when 
‘people’ of that region are defined as a subset of the body-polity of the state, as seems to be the case in 
Catalonia, where Article 7 of the Catalan Statute defines and enfranchises all ‘Catalans’. Here, it 
seems plausible to base both the independence referendum franchise (rather than the over-inclusive 
franchise that is currently proposed) as well as citizenship ab initio on the regional franchise, a 
position which Lopez and Guibernau endorsed. Bauböck, however, argued that the regional franchise 
should not determine citizenship ab initio of the successor state, since ‘regions and independent states 
are polities of different kinds and their membership rules differ accordingly’. But why should 
citizenship on ‘day one’ (as opposed to naturalisation and voluntary renunciation) reflect a different 
polity than that which exercised external self-determination? I remain unconvinced. 
The more challenging scenario is when the regional franchise reflects considerations that suit local 
(rather than national) elections. This is, arguably, the case of Scotland, as the franchise for UK 
regional assemblies, including the Scottish Parliament, is identical to the franchise for local elections. 
Being both over and under-inclusive, the Scottish regional franchise is a misfit, bearing insufficient 
correlation to ‘the people of Scotland’. In such circumstances, both options are unfavourable: one can 
either adopt the regional franchise, thereby weakening the external self-determination claim (see 
Vesco Pakalev’s cogent analysis); or, alternatively, adopt a different franchise which reflects ‘the 
people of X’ but which could suffer from an internal legitimacy deficit. In the UK, a layer of 
complication is added by the fact that the general election franchise would not be a suitable option 
either, for reasons which I discuss below.  
Scotland: a tale of two unfitting franchises  
Although the claims in the kick-off were intended to be of general applicability, the emphasis I placed 
on the Scottish franchise and ab initio citizenship prompted defences thereof by Vidmar and Bernard 
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Ryan. Vidmar argued in reference to Scotland that ‘a variant of the territorial approach appears to be a 
fair choice’; it baffles me how a variant that is based on select list of nationalities among Scotland’s 
residents is considered a fair choice (see also Lopez’s critique of the proposed franchise for the 
Catalan vote on 9 November 2014 which favours EU residents over other migrants in terms of their 
residence eligibility requirement). 
Bernard Ryan pointed to a supposed tension between my two propositions with respect to the 
Scottish referendum franchise; this may be accurate had I proposed the UK general election franchise 
as the basis for the independence referendum franchise. However, the kick-off does no such thing. In 
fact, it points out two follies of the latter franchise: the (arbitrary) 15 year out-of-country residence 
rule that disenfranchised many UK external citizens, and the enfranchisement of qualifying 
Commonwealth and Irish citizens. Rather, my proposition is that because certain non-resident UK 
citizens will be considered citizens ab initio of an independent Scotland, their exclusion from 
participation in the referendum is incongruent.  
Ryan argued that my general approach “runs up against the enduringly pragmatic character of the 
UK’s constitutional arrangement”. Yet, enfranchisement of qualifying Commonwealth and Irish 
citizens is a peculiar feature of the UK and its colonies’ shared imperial past. Even if the UK chooses 
to retain this historical anomaly in future elections (notably, the 2008 Goldsmith report entitled 
‘Citizenship: Our Common Bond’ proposed “limiting in principle the right to vote in Westminster 
elections to UK citizens”; page 75, [17]), I struggle to see the logic and utility behind ‘exporting’ this 
arrangement to the franchise and citizenship arrangements of a newly established state.  
Over-inclusiveness and abstention  
Ben Saunders argued that “we may wish to give the vote to some who will not be given citizenship, 
because we do not wish to accord them other rights that would be afforded by citizenship.” I submit 
that, an election cycle and an external self-determination referendum determining the international 
legal status of a territory are qualitatively different electoral processes; while Saunders’ rationale may 
be applicable in the former, small ‘p’ politics processes, it is not appropriate in the latter, because it 
understates the legal significance of the creation of a new independent state, including with regard to 
the right to enter and remain.  
Saunders suggested that “[t]hose who are long-term residents in Scotland should have a say over its 
future.” Now, perhaps a claim for self-determination of X could theoretically be made by ‘the people 
living and working in X’ (as long as no arbitrary distinctions are made between residents). Why, then, 
should only some of these people be considered the initial members of the independent political 
community which their collective act of participation in an independence referendum has brought into 
being? According to Saunders, non-citizens ‘will be part of that future [of the successor state] even if 
they are not (at least immediately) offered citizenship’. From an international law perspective, this 
proposition is ill-advised: if the territory remains part of the larger, predecessor state, then their future 
in that territory (and in the country as a whole) depends on their immigration status in the country. In 
the event of an affirmative vote, the question whether they will be part of the future of that successor 
state will be determined by their immigration status in that state which, in turn, will be determined by 
the body-polity of that state.  
Vidmar cited the ECtHR Kurić judgment which should presumably calm the anxieties of Polish 
migrants in Scotland. However, this case involved the residence rights of citizens of the predecessor 
state (the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); indeed, Article 14 of the ILC Draft Articles 
enunciates that “the status of persons concerned as habitual residents shall not be affected by the 
succession of states.” From current international law perspective, the security of residence of non-
citizens of the predecessor state, even long-term residents, may be a different matter altogether 
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(although, like Vidmar, I would like to see the logic of the judgment extended in these situations in 
future). 
It is quite tempting to share Saunders’ intuition that ‘it is better to err on the side of generosity 
when allocating voting rights’, since over-inclusiveness guarantees that all putative citizens ab initio 
are enfranchised, and eligible voters may abstain. However, independence referendums may have a 
pass threshold, in which case failing to vote (or abstaining, where voting in a referendum, like in 
elections, is considered mandatory) is effectively a vote against independence; in such referendums, 
there is no neutral position. More fundamentally, the decision to enfranchise (certain) non-citizens or 
(certain) non-residents is a symbolic public statement that they are considered part of the people 
seeking self-determination. It carries normative weight and affects behaviour. It is hardly surprising 
that the Polish migrants in Scotland (surveyed by Derek McGhee and Peitka-Nykaza) are unsure 
whether to participate, as they have been sent conflicting messages: on the one hand, they are invited 
to take part in a historic referendum potentially terminating a 307-year union. On the other hand, they 
are not considered part of the initial citizen-body of a putative Scotland, and (as noted above) their 
security of residence is indeterminate. No wonder many of them refer to their inclusion as a ‘privilege’ 
or a ‘burden’ (rather than as a right or an entitlement) and some of them see themselves as guests who 
ought to vote in a manner that would satisfy the wishes of their kind hosts lest hospitality turns to 
hostility; the problem being, of course, that these wishes are hardly uniform. One could anticipate 
similar dilemmas arising for EU and other migrants in Catalonia, should the franchise follow the 
proposed model. 
Stake-holding and putative citizenship 
In his ‘mid-debate’ summary, Paskalev observed that most contributors have not contested the claim 
that putative citizens of a successor state are significant stake-holders. Kyritsis offered a limited 
normative challenge, arguing that even if it were unproblematic (perhaps even desirable) to 
enfranchise citizens ab initio, their exclusion does not dent the legitimacy of an independence 
referendum. He argued that, the stake-holding of ab initio citizens is not qualitatively different from 
that of citizens of neighbouring states who may be vicariously affected by electoral results (e.g. 
citizens in Latin America affected by U.S. elections). Bauböck made a similar claim with respect to 
citizens of rUK (persons in the fourth category outlined above). Now, it is possible that the 
discernible, daily effect of a change in U.S. administration on a citizen of Venezuela may be greater 
than the effect of Scottish independence on our (now famous) Amsterdam-based former Scottish 
graduate. However, from an international law perspective, the individual status and citizenship-
contingent rights of the former Scottish graduate are meaningfully affected. Kyritsis was right to note 
that, according to Article 8(2) of the ILC Draft Articles, a successor state shall not confer its 
citizenship on our graduate against her will, seeing that she is a UK citizen habitually resident 
elsewhere. Yet the independence of Scotland may force her to choose between UK and Scottish 
citizenships, and that choice may in turn affect her life and work possibilities in the territory to which 
she has an ‘appropriate legal connection’ (elsewhere, Nick Barber discussed some of the challenges 
that non-residents may face in the event of independence).  
Kyritsis further argued that ‘there is no general duty to give people easy choices’; this is undisputed 
but beside the point: it is not the fact that our graduate will be faced with the choice that is at stake 
here, but the fact that she is excluded from the process that may bring about this scenario. Kyritsis’ 
analogy to premium membership fails to encapsulate the significance of exclusion. A more suitable 
analogy would be that of children being faced with (hard and/or exciting) choices that were pre-
determined by their parents. The ability to choose ex-post does not compensate for the symbolic harm 
caused by exclusion ex-ante. Do those seeking external self-determination consider the Amsterdam-
based Scottish graduate merely a potential beneficiary of a decision made in her (electoral) absence, or 
part of the ‘people’ on behalf of whom self-determination is sought? I submit that, like the Polish 
migrant, she has been receiving a mixed message from the independence movement.  
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Strategic ex/inclusion 
Vincent Laborderie’s contribution endorsed adopting an effectively over-inclusive franchise in order 
to discourage political calculations: he proposed that ‘the group of people who would automatically 
obtain citizenship on day one of independence remains [sic] smaller than the group allowed to vote in 
the referendum’. He asserted that the prospect of citizenship ab initio may entice a non-citizen resident 
(e.g. the Polish migrant in the Scottish independence referendum) to favour independence, and so the 
independence movement may be seen to be buying votes; hence, the migrant should be enfranchised, 
but should not constitute part of the initial citizen-body of a successor state. I contend that, the 
normative dilemma whether non-citizen residents should participate in a referendum should not be 
resolved by predictions regarding their voting intentions; surely, no-one would argue that the 
citizenship ab initio of resident citizens should be dependent on their voting intentions, and it is not a 
principled basis for denying membership to others.  
Similarly, Vidmar’s caution against “including the Diaspora too generously” lest it “distort the 
result” is unconvincing: if, as he posited “an independence referendum is an eminently territorial 
question”, then this should be the reason to exclude non-residents (and enfranchise residents), rather 
than the way they are predicted to vote. Interestingly, it has been suggested that the extension of the 
franchise in the Scottish referendum to 16 and 17 year olds may had been driven by a nationalist 
preference (see this response); however, not only can predictions backfire but, critically, the important 
question is whether it is right to extend the franchise. 
The significance of an agreement with the central government  
The question whether the referendum - and the referendum franchise - is agreeable to the self-
determination movement and to the central government (as in the case of Scotland via the Edinburgh 
agreement) is no doubt politically significant, and may determine the likelihood that an affirmative 
vote in an independence referendum will result in independence, de facto and de jure. Laborderie 
observed that, absent an agreement, the independence movement may have an incentive to try to 
tweak the franchise so that it suits its purposes, implying that the need to reach an agreement with the 
central government increases the chance of a genuinely representative referendum. This seems 
intuitively plausible. Indeed, all else equal, an independence referendum that takes place pursuant to 
an agreement is preferable. Laforest and Montigny argued that “gaining consensus between central 
and sub-state government is more important than maintaining consistency between pre- and post- 
independence.” From a realpolitik perspective, this is very sensible. However, while the Edinburgh 
agreement facilitated the smooth running of the referendum, a different franchise could have been 
pursued and agreed between the parties. Saying that consensus trumps consistency is question-
begging. More fundamentally, I maintain that a normatively flawed franchise is not saved by the fact 
that it is endorsed by the central government. Ideally, this examination ought to be conducted before 
an agreement is concluded, should be transparent, and open to public scrutiny.  
In closing 
A historical glimpse may be quite insightful on this occasion. The UN ‘Future Government of 
Palestine’ resolution (General Assembly resolution 181/II of 29 November 1947), commonly known 
as ‘the Partition Plan’, set out a clear blueprint for participation in the elections of the constitutive 
assemblies of the prospective Jewish and Arab states, and for citizenship thereof (section B, entitled 
‘steps preparatory to independence’). Like the ILC Draft Articles, the base-layer for citizenship was 
(Mandate) Palestine citizens resident in the respective states. In turn, the resolution enunciated [10] 
universal suffrage for adult citizens of both genders. The franchise was also intended to include non-
citizen residents, provided that they have “signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such 
State.” As is all too well-known, the arrangements in the partition plan (including partition itself) have 
not materialised, but the blueprint for participation and membership is noteworthy. 
Ruvi Ziegler 
66 
I am much obliged to the EUDO Citizenship forum for hosting this online discussion, to Rainer 
Bauböck and Jo Shaw for scrupulous editing, and to Jean-Thomas Arrighi and Vesco Paskalev for 
providing administrative support. The debate will certainly continue, not least in view of the 
forthcoming vote in Catalonia. Wherever it takes place, let it be informed, respectful, and good-
mannered as this one has been.  
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